

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



STUDENT REPORTS IN SOVIET MILITARY
DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

JAMES J. TRITTEN, ED.

SEPTEMBER 1990

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

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ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Thirty-three synopses of major Soviet works on military strategy, doctrine, and the Soviet Navy. Each entry was prepared by students enrolled in NS 3450, Soviet Military Strategy, at the Naval Postgraduate School in the winter of 1989. Each entry is in chronological order within sections dealing with doctrine & strategy, specialized military subjects, the Soviet Navy, and comparative works. Comparative works analyze similar short monographs such as <u>Whence the Threat to Peace</u> over its revision of four issues. Reports are useful in understanding how Soviet Military/Naval thought had changed over the years.						
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INTRODUCTION

This report of student synopses of major Soviet works on military doctrine, strategy, and the Navy, was written by individual students assigned to an upper level course at the Naval Postgraduate School, NS 3450 (Soviet Military Strategy). Each student was assigned a major historical work in these areas and asked to prepare a short analytical report. Two of the reports at the end are comparative reports where three or four similar or identical Soviet works are compared and contrasted.

The reports are presented in chronological order within major areas so as to allow the reader to view the subject area as it changed over time. Each of these reports is available in English and many have been translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS). A number had been translated by the Soviets themselves (Progress Publishers) or by private publishing houses.

The primary purpose of this collection is to assist students of Soviet military thought in identifying the major works of Soviet literature that are available to them in English. The list of works analyzed is, naturally, not all encompassing. Students can use this report to also summarize the contents of previous works then attempting to assess the literature that is currently appearing from the Soviet Union.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	JAMES J. TRITTEN	
<u>TITLE AND AUTHOR</u>	<u>REVIEWED BY</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>PART I</u> <u>Military Doctrine and Strategy</u>		
The Offensive (A. A. Sidorenko))	Michael Corrigan	1
The Officer's Handbook: A Soviet View (S.N. Kozlov, ed.)	Patrick J. Kolbas	8
Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (N.A. Lomov, ed.)	Richard H. Shirer, Jr.	14
The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (V. Ye Sakin)	Glen C. Ackerman	18
The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War (A.S. Milovidov, Editor-in-chief; V.G. Kozlov, Editor)	Tamara Adams	23
Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (B. Byely, et al.)	Scott A. Kelly	29
The Armed Forces of the Soviet State (A.A. Grechko)	Robert J. White	34
The Initial Period of War (S. P. Ivanov)	Erin K. Marlow	39
The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday (V. Ryabov)	Ross Dickerson	43
The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 (M.N. Kozhevnikov)	Susan L. Theodorelos	47
The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development (S.A. Tyushkevich)	Tom Chassee	50
Local War - History and the Present Day (I. Ye Sharov)	Carl R. Graham	56

<u>TITLE AND AUTHOR</u>	<u>REVIEWED BY</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Always Prepared to Defend the Fatherland (N.V. Ogarkov)	Jacqueline Maher	61
The World Communist Movement (V.V. Zagladin)	Ruth M. Ross	65
Progress in Military Technology and the Armed Forces of the USSR (M.M. Kir'yan)	Robert E. Clark II	70
Marxist -Leninist Teaching on War and and the Army (D.A. Volkogonov, Ed.)	Marvin Knorr, Jr.	75
M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist (M.A. Gareev)	Allan C. Polley	80
History Teachings Vigilance (N.V. Ogarkov)	Stephen P. Black	85
Tactics (V.G. Reznichenko, Ed., et al.)	Kenneth L. Knotts, Jr.	92
The Military Policy of the CPSU (V.F. Khalipov)	Thomas A. Fries	99

PART II Specialized Military Subjects

Military Psychology (V.V. Shelyag, Ed., et al.)	Deena R. Sostrom	103
Forecasting in Military Affairs A Soviet View (Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov)	Kenneth J. Jones	108
Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control (P.K. Altukhov, et al.)	Douglas E. Walker	114
Civil Defense (P.T. Yegorov, et. al)	Steven A. White	120
Economic Conflict in Warfare (S.A. Bartenev)	Michael L. Donner, Sr.	126

<u>TITLE AND AUTHOR</u>	<u>REVIEWED BY</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Protection of National Economic Facilities From Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Handbook (G.P. Demidenko)	Diego R. Corral	136
 <u>PART III Soviet Navy</u>		
Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 (V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich)	K. Michelle Emerson	140
The Sea Power of the State (S.G. Gorshkov)	Michael J. Udell	144
The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development and Employment (N.P. V'yunenکو, Ed., et. al)	John D. Hearing	150
 <u>PART IV Comparative Documents</u>		
The Threat to Europe (Progress Publishers 1981)	Gary Grooms	157
How to Avert the Threat to Europe (Progress Publishers 1981)		
The New Threat to Europe: Who is to Blame? (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1984)		
Whence the Threat to Peace (Collective Authors)	Paul Brown	162
The U.S. Military Doctrine (Generikh Trofimenko)	Michael Weiss	169

PART I

MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

THE OFFENSIVE

by

A. A. Sidorenko

Reviewed by: MICHAEL CORRIGAN

The first and last sentences of this book bracket it in establishing and reinforcing the level of military art discussed. "Be it an engagement of podrazdeleniye, chast,' or soyedineniye or a battle of operational ob" vedineniye - only the offensive leads to the attainment of victory over the enemy."¹ "This book was designed to facilitate the broadening of the officers' tactical horizon."² The book is concerned with the operational and, mainly, tactical level of military art. In addition, these sentences reveal the foundation of the primacy of the offensive and the intended audience for the work. The change in this level of military art induced by the advent of tactical nuclear weapons is used as an organizational locus and fundamental theme. The author emphasizes that a change has occurred and implied is that his book is necessary to ensure that tactical war planners do not fight the last war.³ Each element of the offensive, as well as particular tactical situations- surmounting water barriers and night actions,

¹p.1 "The Offensive" A.A. Sidorenko 1970 published in English in the Soviet Military Thought Series.

²p. 222 ibid.

³p. 5 "we cannot mechanically transfer the experience of past wars to a new situation, this can bring only harm."

are examined under the influence of the new technology and its capabilities. The target of this tactical nuclear offensive is NATO.⁴

In his initial historical section the author develops trends in warfare which he carries over into an understanding of nuclear weapons usage and impact. The "continuous increase in scope of the offensive"⁵; the "increase in the maneuverability of the combat actions"⁶; the increase in the number of strikes aimed at creating favorable conditions for breakthroughs⁷; "the role of fire increased"⁸; the decrease of artillery fire preparation time coincident with the increase in artillery fire density⁹; the dispersal of units on the attack¹⁰; all are shown as evolutionary forces in warfare that, it is inferred, continue with the advent of nuclear weapons. After placing nuclear weapons in the context of the continuum of warfare's evolution, the author moves to develop the changes in warfare and specifically in the offensive as themes in his analysis of the impact of tactical nuclear weapons.

⁴p. ix Titles to chap.2 pt2 and chap.8 pt2, *ibid.*

⁵p. 9 *ibid.*

⁶p. 12 *ibid.*

⁷p. 14-15 *ibid.*

⁸p. 17 *ibid.*

⁹p. 23 *ibid.*

¹⁰p. 25 *ibid.*

Establishing "foreign specialist"¹¹ as a surrogate, Col. Sidorenko advances the idea that the side employing a first strike will win¹² and that preemption will ensure superiority and retention of the initiative.¹³ While developed only once in the book and only in the space of a few pages, and while being attributed to the West; it does not seem that these facts are indicators of small importance. Some downplaying of this important theme seems evident.

Nuclear weapons will act as the maneuver and mass at the axis of attack to provide surprise and massed firepower blowing the hole for a breakthrough. The difference between this and the conventional search for the weak spot for breakthrough exploitation in even the strongest enemy concentrations.¹⁴ The author's stated goals for the offensive are twofold: "the utter rout of the enemy in short times and the seizure of important areas."¹⁵ Nuclear weapons are seen to be capable of achieving the first goal. The difference between this capability and the former situation is that nuclear weapons accomplish this goal independently.¹⁶ The second principal theme after preemption is that nuclear weapons will act

¹¹p. 112 *ibid.*

¹²p. 112 *ibid.*

¹³p. 115 *ibid.*

¹⁴p. 88 *ibid.*

¹⁵p. 5 *ibid.*

¹⁶p. 41 *ibid.*

as a unitary maneuver and mass instrument. The author recognizes however that they can accomplish only the first goal of the offensive, destruction of the enemy. The second goal must be accomplished by other forces.

This leads to another proposition, that combined arms; armor, airborne, aviation, especially, and nuclear strikes must be coordinated and used together to achieve both goals of the offensive."¹⁷ "The primary mission of the attacking podrazdeleniye and chast' will become the rapid exploitation of nuclear strikes, completion of the smashing of surviving enemy forces, and the seizure of specific positions, areas, and objectives." ¹⁸ The special characteristic of armored units are shown to be particularly well suited to nuclear warfare and exploitation of gaps created by nuclear weapons in enemy defenses.¹⁹ Given the historical Soviet superiority in tanks, perhaps they should have, in part, been regarded as a nuclear warfare asset. Airborne troops are evaluated as being well suited to nuclear war strikes in the enemy's rear.²⁰ Aviation is promoted as a method of nuclear strike delivery and a means to destroy the enemy's nuclear capability.²¹ The book shows a thoroughly integrated all arms approach to nuclear

¹⁷p. 89 *ibid.*

¹⁸p. 42 *ibid.*

¹⁹p. 46 *ibid.*

²⁰p. 50 *ibid.*

²¹p. 47 *ibid.*

warfare as consistent with achieving both goals of the offensive.

Backpedalling to the idea that one of aviation's missions is to destroy the enemy's means of nuclear strike, the book actually expands this theme to be a primary mission of all arms of the Soviet forces. "On the whole, it should be said that combating enemy means of nuclear attack in combined arms combat has now become the basic content of combat actions and has become a function of all commanders without exception."²² The reason for this is the acknowledgement that without timely, rapid and persistent destruction of the enemy's nuclear capability, the offensive could fail.²³

Retaining the tactical level of understanding; and given the author's foundation that nuclear weapons have changed tactical warfare; four principle themes have been presented. They are: preemption, nuclear arms as maneuver and mass applications of force, combined arms nuclear war at the tactical level, and the new primary objective of destruction of the enemy's means to wage nuclear war. Using these themes and an analysis of the offensive, the author presents a very detailed how to conduct the tactical offensive in nuclear war for the Soviet officer.

In historical context, the Soviet Union had just achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. at the time the book was published. The 1978 entry to the Soviet Military Encyclopedia on "The

²²p. 137 *ibid.*

²³p. 134 *ibid.*

Offensive" written by Col. Sidorenko shows a discrepancy in emphasis when compared to his book. The first and last pages of the book mention nuclear weapons and the in between is replete with their impact on tactical warfare. The encyclopedia entry spends 10 lines out of an 8 page text on nuclear war. What seems to have happened is that once nuclear parity had been achieved and the Soviet leadership saw that it had the capability to attain conventional victory over NATO it rejected the preeminent role of nuclear weapons assigned in Colonel Sidorenko's book. The 1983 Military Encyclopedic Dictionary entry under "The Offensive" is almost verbatim from the 1978 Soviet Military Encyclopedia entry except for the phrase "nuclear weapons became the principal means of destruction in nuclear warfare." This is definitely a further downgrading of the importance of nuclear weapons. Whether it is also an indication that limited nuclear war is possible because other means of destruction are paramount in nuclear war is conjecture.

This work is a detailed handbook for the Soviet tactician, giving him guidelines for changing conventional procedures to accommodate the different conditions of nuclear war on the tactical scale. For anyone attempting to understand past Soviet equipment and personnel nuclear warfighting capabilities in a tactical perspective, this book will be elucidating. As to actual nuclear warfighting intentions, whether past or present, this book should not be presented as authoritative.

THE OFFICER'S HANDBOOK: A SOVIET VIEW

by

S.N. Kozlov, Ed.

Reviewed by: PATRICK J. KOLBAS

The Officer's Handbook reached Soviet bookstores in 1971 as the fifteenth book in the Soviet Officer's Library having a press run of 83,000 books. Intended for all Soviet officers, but especially for the junior officers, the book was aimed at broadening "their outlook on military theory and solving problems related to the training and education of their subordinates" (p. xi).

At times a very readable and interesting work while at others a rather tedious and boring experience, the topics covered by the 12 chapters range from the expected -- the CPSU and the Soviet Armed Forces, Marxist-Leninist Military Theory -- to the not so expected -- The Fundamentals of Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy, The Essentials of Sanitation and Hygiene. Yet, when one considers what is put forth in the American equivalents -- The Division Officer's Guide and Watchstander's Guide and some of the trivial information in them -- the fact is that more emphasis is given in The Officer's Handbook to a broader view of where the Soviet officer fits within the Soviet system. As a result, this work is useful and important in gaining a basic understanding of the Soviet system.

Recognizing that the book was published nearly 20 years old raises some questions as to its relevancy today. Several important themes permeate the book and it is interesting to note how they have changed with the recent events in the Soviet Union.

The first major theme involves the military doctrine of the Soviet Union and its ultimate success over the imperialist order. Throughout the book one will find statements implying directly and not so directly that the entire reason for the armed forces of the Soviet Union is to defend the gains of the socialist revolution against the aggressive capitalists led by the United States. All major military related developments in the narrative are framed in the context of reacting to some aggressive and offensively oriented action performed by the United States and its allies. The best example is the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 (p. 212) which is characterized as a defensive organization in response to the formation of NATO in 1949.

However, within this theme of defensiveness, the military doctrine of the Soviet Union is clearly designed with an offensive orientation in order to take the war to the enemy (p. 63) and to win any war decisively. Nuclear war is called the most dangerous form of warfare but consideration of it naturally occupies the most important place in Soviet military doctrine because the capitalists (supposedly) are preparing to wage such a war against the Soviet Union. Thus, similar preparations must come from the Soviets. Again, the stated goal is to win the war rapidly and decisively with the premier role given to nuclear

weapons and the Strategic Rocket Forces. While the possibility of conventional war with no nuclear weapons is also mentioned (p. 63) it is almost as an afterthought. Throughout the discussion are the implications that a war will be global and involve coalitions on both sides.

The emphasis on the SRF and nuclear war is further highlighted in the chapter discussing the armed forces of the Soviet Union. The forces are listed and discussed in the following order: Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, Special Troops (included within the Ground Forces but discussed separately due to their supporting role), Airborne Forces, Air Defense, the Air Force, and lastly the Navy. The SRF is again identified as the main service while the Navy's main task is given to launching nuclear missile strikes, destroying the atomic submarines and strike forces of the enemy at sea and at home, and providing support to land operations. Clearly, no doubt should exist as to the seriousness given 20 years ago to nuclear war and the desire to win one should it have happened.

Obviously today the theme of nuclear war and the decisive impact of nuclear weapons has changed with the advent of Gorbachev. His denunciation of the utility of nuclear weapons for war, the live and let live atmosphere directed towards the West, perestroika, and the resulting debate in the Soviet Union "reasonable sufficiency" and its impact on the orientation of the armed forces makes the theme of Soviet Military Doctrine discussed here (if one believes the Soviet Union is truly

changing) generally invalid.

Even given this change in their military doctrine, an interesting contradiction is seen when examining the chronology at the end of chapter 5 (The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union) called "Dates of Most Important Events." Here the reader discovers continual reference to significant military events in the Soviet Union including the first ballistic missile launch in 1947, the test explosion of a thermonuclear device in 1953, and the launching of Sputnik in 1957. The dates for the comparable American events followed. So then, who is the aggressor and who the reactionary? One can only admire the manner in which the Soviets play both sides of the fence. One side is used to justify the doctrine and preparations of the armed forces while the other side is used to provide proof of the advancements orchestrated by the CPSU in order to give it an atmosphere of legitimacy.

The second major theme changing today is the dominating, all powerful, and all knowing presence of the CPSU in the Soviet Union. As the organizing nucleus for the entire social system, the CPSU is set forth as the supreme and ultimate authority. The tone again emphasizes that the growth and success of the country is solely due to the efforts and planning of the CPSU and its use of Marxist-Leninism. Proof of this success is best demonstrated through a reading of the chronology at the end of chapter 5 already mentioned. All the successes of the Soviet Union (no failures allowed) are listed in including the victories in the

Great Patriotic War, the defeat of the Japanese (without any other country contributing), the successful rebuilding and growth of the Soviet Union following the war, etc.

Today, this theme of the superiority of the CPSU is obviously in question. The changes within the Soviet Union and the manner in which Gorbachev is doing them demonstrates his, and others, recognition that the CPSU and its entire discourse on the eventual success of Marxist-Leninism in the world has lost whatever legitimacy it once had. The Soviet people may not have truly believed the CPSU's claims in any case but at least they acquiesced while order was maintained and some of the basic needs met.

The last point of interest which permeates the book is easily noticed. The Soviets love to quantify and elaborate to the smallest detail on some relatively minor issue as a means of demonstrating progress and superiority. For example, the improvement of present submarines to previous ones is shown through the use of factors: 100 times the power-to-displacement ratio, 5 times the diving depth, and 3-4 times the speed. Another example is provided in the chapter on general reference data which provides such information as exchange rates, various geometric formulas, and a discussion on atomic physics, to name but a few. The basic impression is the great reliance by the Soviets on scientific and quantification as a means of explaining and justifying their actions and success.

Though 20 years old and suffering from the changes in the

Soviet Union, this is still a useful book to read. Since it is written for the junior Soviet Officer and covers a variety of areas, it can serve as a primer into such areas as their military doctrine (as it once was), the CPSU, and the general theories of Marxist-Leninism without getting into extreme detail. It also provides a look at how the Soviets view themselves and other societies, especially America and the West.

Thus, The Officer's Handbook is useful if used as an introduction to the Soviet system prior to digging into other more detailed works. Even if the changes happening there now appear to be making the major themes irrelevant, The Officer's Handbook is still important for the history and context it provides.

SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

by

N.A. Lomov, ed.

Reviewed by: RICHARD H. SHIRER, JR.

Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs describes the present state of the Soviet military as a function of scientific determinism, Marxism-Leninism and the capitalist threat. This book is authored by a distinguished group of military writers including Maj Gen Cherednichenko, with an overall editorial supervision by Col-Gen N.A. Lomov, Maj-Gen I.I. Anureyer and Col M.I. Galkin, who was also the leader of the group of authors. Col-Gen Lomov, formerly assigned to the General Staff Academy is the primary editor. The book is part of the Officer's Library and American editors comments states that "according to Soviet newspaper reports, it is the seventeenth and final volume to be issued in the series." Examining every aspect of Soviet military affairs, the book is a good summary of Soviet thought up to the time of its publication--1973.

Written with the same pretentious scientific--truth style of a Jehovah's witness pamphlet, the book is, nevertheless, worthwhile reading to understand the Soviet's view of military affairs. Beginning with a qualitative overview of nuclear and

conventional weapons, the authors go on to correlate space forces, discuss the organization of Soviet forces, make a current statement of military strategy and explain proper tactics, methods of troop control and scientific troop leadership--all in relationship to the scientific-technical revolution.

Scientific technical progress according to the authors is the natural result of the Industrial Revolution. While the Soviet Union would be contented to let the benefits of the scientific--technical revolution go to the people, the threat from capitalism necessities that military defense be competitive. After explaining, in a deterministic Darwinian manner, why these high tech weapons are necessary, the book qualitatively describes the balance of weapons both nuclear and conventional. An interesting paragraph on page 92 gives the West credit with developing the carrier -- a "major technical achievement" but says that even in WWII, aviation and submarines were effective against them. Furthermore, "with the appearance of nuclear weapons, atomic submarines with homing missiles and torpedos... the ship is more vulnerable." examples like this point out U.S. mistakes in military thinking, (it also shows the Soviet tactical nuclear solution to the carrier).

The book discusses the Soviet military organization. It is the result of scientific application of military principles and encompasses:

1. Strategic Missile Forces
2. Land Forces

3. National Air Defense Force

4. Air Force

5. Navy

This organization is "correct" and best suited to the perceived threat in the modern world.

The most significant part of the book expounds Soviet strategy as a result of scientific--technical progress. Basically, this means that because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, strategic goals must be accomplished with great accelerity. "The most important strategic principle is the necessity of providing continuous strategic control over the armed forces..." The rest of the book goes on to discuss how to accomplish this through troop control, tactics, scientific leadership and the spirit of the people and the proper military doctrine.

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THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONAL ART AND TACTICS

by

V. Ye Sakin

Reviewed by: GLEN C. ACKERMAN

The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics was published in 1972 in 13,000 copies and was translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. The book is part of the Soviet military thought collection. According to the editor this book is intended for officers and generals of the Soviet Army, and it was probably the most important Soviet military publication of that year.

According to Soviet military theorists, military art is divided into three components: tactics, operational art, and strategy. This book focuses on operational art and tactics from a Marxist-Leninist point of view with an emphasis on history, theory, and practical application. The book is divided into three chapters and covers the gamut of military art (operational art and tactics) from its beginnings in ancient times to its use on today's nuclear battlefields.

The first chapter is titled - Principles of Military Art in works by Military Leaders and Theoreticians of the Past. As the title suggests, this chapter is a history lesson with a Marxist-Leninist persuasion. It sets forth the contributions to military art by past bourgeois theoreticians and military leaders. Most of these bourgeois military theorists did not contribute any major

scientific generalizations about the laws of armed conflict or principles of military art according to the author. Rather, they contributed some good thoughts on tactics and strategy alone. The author states that "these bourgeois thoughts took place empirically, proceeding from the immediate demands of practice, and not on the basis of analysis." He does give credit to one pre-Lenin Russian general (A.V. Suvorov 1730-1800) as having been a great theorist and contributor to new principles and tactics. He further states that this analysis could not be done before the appearance of Marxist-Leninist teachings. From a Soviet perspective these themes have merit, yet it seems the author could have given more credit to Western theorists such as: Clausewitz, Moltke, Napoleon, and Liddell Hart to name a few. He also fails to emphasize that the German Army of WWII performed some fairly impressive operations without the benefit of Marxists-Leninist teachings!

The other major theme of this chapter deals with change and evolution of the principles of military art. There are no constants or eternal principles in military art, they change and evolve. This is because technology, advances in science, and thus the means of waging war are ever changing.

The author concludes this chapter by saying the basic provisions of the theory of Soviet military art have been confirmed by the experience of war. While confirming Soviet theories with latter WWII examples he fails to confront the huge learning curve of 1941-42. Furthermore he gives little credit to

the allies or to German problems in other theaters.

The second chapter, Essence and Importance of Principles of Military Art and of Laws of Armed Warfare, Their Dialectical Correlation, Use and Classification, states in detail the authors four laws of war and his two laws of armed conflict. He speaks of their dialectical correlation (armed conflict is only part of war) and of their practical utilization. Savkin also lists his seven basic principles of military art that emerge in the 1950's with the adoption of nuclear weapons.

According to Savkin, one cannot understand the laws of war until one understands the philosophical concept of a law. He goes into exhausting detail describing what a law, and science is. A firm understanding of these "laws" is essential to victory, and violations will doom one to defeat. "History shows that the violation of laws of armed conflict leads to defeat even by smaller enemy forces, let alone in battle with a strong and able foe." As with his point that technology, science, and thus wars are ever changing, this theme is fairly straightforward. An army obviously needs to follow certain "laws", which at times can seem to be common sense, to be victorious. One can find numerous "upsets" in history to show his point. Yet, some of these "upsets" did occur before Marxist-Leninist "laws" were described. Therefore these points lose some merit.

The final theme of this chapter is the fact that the laws of war, laws of armed conflict, and the principle of military art are closely related. But, their mixing is a mistake and that

this is a major problem among bourgeois military theorists. This is an interesting concept that seems to have worked well for the Soviets since 1943. Savkin concludes chapter two with practical examples of military art.

The final chapter, Summary of the Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, is the real heart of the book and it focuses on the second phase of development of the Soviet armed forces (1953-1959). It is during this phase of development that operational art and tactics changed the greatest. The change according to Savkin was due to technological advances, and the possible employment of nuclear weapons.

Savkin's seven principles of military art; mobility, concentration of effort, surprise, combat activeness, preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly force, conformity of the goal and plan of operation, and coordination; are graphically explained with numerous historical and contemporary examples. His main emphasis is on mobility, high rates of combat operations, and concentration of effort. With his focus on these three principles of military art, Savkin calls for their use in conjunction with nuclear strikes.

In the overall analysis it seems Colonel Savkin is trying to put out three main themes. First, science and technology are ever changing and influencing war and the military. Therefore the laws of war, laws of armed conflict, and the principles of military art are ever changing. Yet, most bourgeois military theorists have not realized this. Second, understanding the laws

and principles, and their proper use is essential to attain victory. It seems that only Soviets understand this due to their Marxist-Leninist ideology. Finally, the author believes that nuclear weapons can and should be used on today's modern battlefield.

Savkin articulates his themes well, but as with most Soviet writers he has a selective memory when reviewing history. The West, though certainly not Germany, may well be behind in its study of war, laws, and principles. But, this is certainly not attributable to its lack of Marxist-Leninist ideology. His view on nuclear weapons in modern warfare is interesting from today's point of view because it seems his time frame was off. According to the American editor, due to editorial caveats, the stipulated time frame (53-59) should be contemporary nature of the subject matter. It seems that with the limitations on numbers and sophistication of nuclear weapons during this time frame, especially in the early to mid 1950's, it would seem that the editor is correct. Whether Savkin's book is of a historical or contemporary nature is not as important as its valuable insights into Soviet ideas on operational art and tactics. It should be required reading for most field grade U.S. Army officers!

The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War

by

A.S. Milovidov, Editor-in-chief; V.G. Kozlov, Editor.

Reviewed by: TAMARA ADAMS

The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War was written by a group of authors who, as the title suggests, attempted to place "the problems of contemporary war" within the context of Lenin's teachings. Published in 1972, the book came out in 27,000 copies, suggesting that it was "meant for wide educational use within the Soviet Military."¹

Since the book was meant for such wide use within the Soviet military, it is not surprising to find that the book presents a generalized view of military doctrine according to party line. The first five chapters deal with the socio-political aspects of military doctrine. For example, the book addresses the difference between just and unjust wars according to Lenin. Lenin's thesis, according to the book's authors, was that "peace... will advance the cause to an infinitely greater extent than war"² and that as such, "our army [the Soviet Army] has been, is now, and will continue to be an army of peace, a

¹Milovidov, General-Major A.S. and Kozlov, Colonel V.G., Editors, The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War, Moscow, 1972. English translation, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. p.v.

²Ibid., p. 17.

dependable bulwark of security for all people."³

While the idea of "peace" sounds comforting to most Western ears, it is important to note that the word has quite a different meaning to Soviets. The authors of Problems in Contemporary War make this clear in their discussion of just versus unjust wars. "Just wars," according to the book, are "progressive" whereas "unjust" wars are "reactionary."⁴ The book identifies imperialism as "the source of all antagonistic conflicts of the present-day world, the source of war danger."⁵ Even so, just wars are acceptable and include "wars in defense of the socialist homeland" and are governed by a policy of active defense of the peace and strengthening of international security ... [a policy which] is permeated with a spirit of internationalism and solidarity with revolutionary progressive forces throughout the world."⁶ As such, the Soviets view their armed forces and the armed forces of their allies as "a bulwark of all freedom-loving peoples."⁷

According to the book, Lenin's philosophy is one of non-aggression; in fact, of the belief that were it not for

³Ibid., p. 20. Taken from L.I. Brezhnev: Delo Lenina zhivet i pobezhdayet, (Lenin's Cause Is Alive and Is Triumphant), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 21.

⁴Ibid., p. 29.

⁵Ibid., p. 30

⁶Ibid., p. 42.

⁷Ibid., p. 51.

imperialist aggression, the proletariat would not need such a powerful army for "defense of the socialist homeland."⁸ Paradoxically, however, the authors speak of the "external function of the socialist army," carefully noting that "with the emergence of socialism beyond the boundaries of a single country and the establishment of a world socialist system, the external function of defense of the entire socialist camp in cooperation with the other fraternal armies. It essentially functions as a constituent part of the international armed forces of socialism."⁹ The dimensions of the "socialist homeland," under good defense," according to viewpoints presented in the book, "should always be conducted offensively."¹⁰

After the discussion of the socio-political aspects of war in Problems of Contemporary War, the authors present Soviet scientific and technical aspects of war according to Lenin. The authors pay particular attention to the development of the armed forces, the training and education of the troops, and the importance of economics in defense. In addition, they stress the nature of the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism and the necessity of cultural indoctrination and morale building in the Soviet system. "Ideological conditioning of youth and its training to defend the homeland" are seen as

⁸Ibid., p. 79.

⁹Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 107. Taken from K. Marx and F. Engles, Soch (Works), Volume 15, p. 260.

part of the Soviet military's training and education tactics.¹¹

Likewise, it is seen as important to break the morale of enemy forces. That this is a part of Soviet military doctrine is apparent in the following excerpt:

The goals in ideological struggle in warfare can be divided purely arbitrarily into strategic and tactical goals. The strategic goal is determined by the political goals of warfare and is connected with the war plan as a whole ... The tactical (operational) goal of agitation - propaganda work against enemy troops and population lies in undermining or weakening the morale of a specific group of enemy troops and the populace of adjoining regions, as well as stopping enemy ideological diversions against our own troops and populace.¹²

Another important thesis of Lenin that is brought out in the book is "the necessity of combining various types of weapons, of being prepared to utilize potential forms of combat."¹³ Along with this broad vision, the authors of the book point out how such elements as physical training, achieving total literacy and "borrowing everything of value from European and American science" contributes to the outcome of a potential war.¹⁴ According to the soviet viewpoint, "modern warfare is not an impersonal clash between missiles," but requires self-sacrifice. Training Soviet troops to fight such a battle "consists in forming in personnel communist convictions and excellent moral-

¹¹Ibid., p. 132.

¹²Ibid., p. 211.

¹³Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 170, 174.

combat and psychological qualities, ensuring constant readiness for combat, intellectual and spiritual firmness, and an invincible will to fight to victory."¹⁵

Generally, the themes in Problems of Contemporary War are presented in a logical, straightforward manner. Occasionally, the themes begin to sound like propaganda as the authors attempt to glorify Soviet ideology and approach to war by contrasting it with capitalistic views. Occasionally, the authors seem to contradict themselves. For example, they identify civil defense as undesirable because it "intensifies the reactionary nature of internal policy, promotes the deterioration of a country to a military dictatorship, and greatly broadens the sphere of militarism."¹⁶ Almost in the same breath, they defend Soviet civil defense activities with the assertion that "socialist humanitarianism" permeates all such activities.¹⁷ Of course, the difference between capitalist and Soviet civil defense is easily explained, from the Soviet viewpoint, by the nature of just versus unjust wars.

In spite of occasional resemblance to propaganda, The Problems of Contemporary War is very informative and worthwhile. Initially written "for [Soviet] officers, generals and all

¹⁵Ibid., p. 191.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 246.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 249.

students of Lenin's military-theoretical heritage,"¹⁸ the book is currently a good base document for American officers and generals to rely on for a fairly accurate picture of the Soviet view on war during the 1970s. Since understanding Lenin is an essential part of understanding Soviet military doctrine's heritage and traditional direction, the book is useful for those interested in contrasting past military doctrine with current events in an effort to judge the authenticity of the Soviet Union's claim to a changing doctrine. As such, the book is important, maybe even critical for anyone who purports to understand the significance of current events as they relate to Soviet military doctrine today.

¹⁸Ibid., p. v.

MARXISM-LENINISM ON WAR AND ARMY

by

B. Byely, et. al.

Reviewed by: SCOTT A. KELLY

Marxism-Leninism on War and Army is "listed in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia as a basic reference for the subject of military doctrine." "It is identified for the attention of Soviet officers, generals and admirals." This book is made up of a collective of military authors, ranging from Captain 1st Rank up to Major-General. The book was printed by Progress Publishers in Moscow in 1972 and released under the "auspices of the United States Air Force in 1973."

The book maintains that Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical foundation of Soviet Military doctrine and military science and that the leadership of the CPSU is the fundamental basis underlying all Soviet military development. "The elaboration of Soviet military doctrine, which was generalized the military experience in our epoch, the emergence and development of Soviet military science, are organically linked with Marxist-Leninist philosophy."¹

A major theme that runs throughout the book is the likelihood of and preparation for a thermonuclear war between the two opposing social systems (capitalism and socialism). This seems to be in

¹Col. B. Byely et al., Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, publisher under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 294.

line with most of the other Soviet military writings at the times between the period 1966-1974 which "centered on how to carry out the various operations called for in the conduct of a general nuclear war."²

The book contends that a nuclear war would still be a continuation of politics by violent means, only that it would be different in scale and the qualitative ways in achieving political aims.³ It also states that once war comes it will be an all out nuclear war and brands the United States "flexible response" stance as senseless.

The book evidences the serious thought and preparation the Soviets take towards a future nuclear war. Firstly, the authors accept the massive losses of lives as an inevitable part of the war. The text notes "huge, irreplaceable losses as a typical feature of nuclear missile war."⁴ The authors also consider reconstitution efforts after massive nuclear exchanges. They mention that some parts of industrial and economic enterprises would survive and that "the remaining enterprises would be engaged

²Edward L. Warner III, Soviet concepts and capabilities for Limited Nuclear War: What We Know and How We Know It (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corp., 1989). 17.

³Col. N. Byely et al., Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, USGPO, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 29.

⁴Ibid., p. 276.

in the production of weapons and in catering to the needs of the population who have survived the bombings and radiation."⁵

The book discusses certain areas and concerns that need to be addressed prior to the capitalists unleashing of the next world war. Firstly, it emphasizes preparedness for the future. When talking of the initial German attack in 1941, the authors mention the first strikes of the German troops and the serious setbacks of the Soviet Army.⁶ Concomitantly, the book promotes the offense as the principle character in conducting a future war vice the defense as espoused by the current leadership today.

Secondly, the authors engage in mirror imaging concerning the need for massive armies, for modern wars could not be waged without them."⁷ They mention the necessity of a 3:1 ratio in forces to secure the successful outcome of armed struggle in war. This force ratio is essentially still in line with Soviet military writings today. Additionally, the book infers the continual need to build up arms. The authors state that "victory and defeat of the warring states, the course and the outcome of wars, depends on the whole directly on the correlation of their military power."⁸

Thirdly, the Soviets voice a fear of the U.S. Navy in a future nuclear confrontation. They underscore this fear in stating their

⁵Ibid., p. 223.

⁶Ibid., p. 119.

⁷Ibid., p. 151.

⁸Ibid., p. 211.

belief that the "navy was to have command over fifty percent of the U.S. nuclear potential."⁹ Additionally, they refer to the ability of the enemy to strike his opponent's deep rear by using missiles of an "operational-tactical designation carried by aircraft and submarines, especially atomic-powered submarines."¹⁰

Lastly, the Soviets show obvious concern that they are lagging behind the capitalist nations in technology and flag its extreme importance in the coming war. The book refers to the socialist camp as having a pronounced advantage over the capitalist society in regards to development and application of the social sciences. It doesn't mention, however, the socialist camp having a distinct advantage in the natural sciences and technology, implying a sense of inferiority. The authors also state a fear of the capitalist camp surprising the Soviets with a new technology at the initial onset of war.

A second but lesser theme that runs throughout this book is the Soviet's resolve for the exportation of revolution abroad; the support for national liberation movements in Third World countries. The Soviets considered it their duty to help the oppressed peoples against imperialism. The book mentions the "defence of the socialist countries being indissoluble from the granting of comprehensive assistance to the national liberation movement of the

⁹Ibid., p. 160.

¹⁰Ibid., p.222.

peoples oppressed by imperialism."¹¹ Today, the Soviets seem to have given up outright support for national liberation movements.

This book shows how the teachings of Marxism-Leninism drive the development of Soviet military doctrine. It emphasizes the inevitability and survivability of a nuclear war and the subsequent need for preparation. It also emphasizes the continued resolve of the Soviets to export revolution to Third World countries. I recommend this book be read by anyone serious in studying Soviet military literature.

¹¹Ibid., p. 127.

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET STATE

by

A.A. Grechko

Reviewed by: ROBERT J. WHITE

It is often noted that the Soviet system relies on several key institutions in order to implement policy and control society. The armed forces are always considered among the key social constituent parts used by the state to enforce political and social discipline. In his book, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, Soviet Marshal Grechko utilized his authority as Soviet Minister of Defense to analyze a variety of political, social, and technological issues that were affecting the army and Soviet society. The book, by its significant print run (300,000 copies), was intended to reach a wide segment of the professional officer corps as well as Communist Party (CPSU) functionaries. The twelfth and final volume of the US Air Force's Soviet Military Thought series of translations, Grechko's book is a wide-ranging commentary on the significance of the armed forces in Soviet society.

A major theme that is evident throughout the book is the inseparability of the army with the political policy of the CPSU. Lenin, utilizing military and social principles that are as relevant today as they were in the first years of the Soviet state, created a new and ultimately invincible force in the Red Army. The triumph of the Bolsheviks and the defeat of counter-

revolutionary groups is interpreted as the true proof of Lenin's military genius. Armed with Leninist principles, Grechko argues that the Soviet army and the CPSU represent a new and irreversible force in the history of the world.

Grechko, by stressing the scientific correctness of the Leninist interpretations and the leading role for the CPSU in society, illustrates the great significance Soviets attach to rigid centralization. Individual initiative is to be discouraged in the army. The leadership of the CPSU is by definition infallible, and as such the army is the representation of the Party.

In Grechko's analysis, a review of Soviet military history validates the social and military policy of the CPSU and the correctness of a class-based analysis of the international system. Thus, in reference to the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War, the war's outcome was "historically determined and axiomatic."¹ Based on the dialectical analysis of history and the contemporary international system, Grechko and the Soviets are in a totally unique position to observe the contradictions of the capitalist system and its ultimate transformation into a system of proletarian internationalism. The very legitimacy of the CPSU and the role of the army is a reflection of the scientific analysis of historical events and the world system.

However, as a socialist state in a hostile international

¹A. A. Grechko. The Armed Forces of the Soviet State. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), 63.

system, the army and the Party must be constantly prepared for political and possibly armed conflict with the imperialist states. Accordingly, Grechko argues that the defense forces of the state are by definition to be accorded preeminence in resource allocation. Grechko clearly believes that the CPSU has no more important mission than to ensure the defense of the Revolution from imperialist aggression. In reality, this has meant that the USSR has historically endured a major burden for defense, and Grechko never addresses at what point defense spending may actually detract from overall national vitality.

This commitment of resources to the armed forces is required, according to Grechko, due to the changes in warfare that have occurred as a result of scientific progress. Due to these changes, it is crucial that the Soviets strive to maintain technological modernity in their armed forces. This is especially critical in light of the advent of nuclear weapons, which constitute the principle factor of modern war and pose the greatest danger to the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, Grechko draws a clear link between the advancement of Soviet scientific abilities and the proficiency of the armed forces. Inherent in the belief that science has sparked a revolution in military affairs is the implicit warning of dire military consequences should the Soviets ignore technological progress. Indeed, the changes engendered by nuclear weapons are so significant that in modern times the Strategic Rocket Forces "compromise the combat might of the

Soviet Armed Forces" and appear to be the most important service in Grechko's view.² More broadly, scientific progress has changed conduct of war, with time more concentrated and space constrained. Overall, Grechko appears to accept that future war will be fought with nuclear weapons, and as such the Soviet armed forces must be able to prevail.³

The influence of scientific change and its affect on military science is one of the principle themes of the book. Grechko clearly not only wants the armed forces to understand the changes resulting from technology, but is also lecturing the Party on the criticality of technological progress. The Party must make the political effort to ensure that the armed forces are equipped with the latest weapons.

A key mission for the Soviet army is political socialization. Fortified by the class dialectic, the Soviet view is that the armed forces represent the natural aspirations of the people. The Soviet armed forces also represent in Soviet society a monopolization of political indoctrination and a key link between the political agenda of the Party and transmitting this agenda to the masses.

Grechko provides what might be called a traditional view of Soviet military science. The necessity of the offensive, mass, and total defeat of the enemy emerge as the cornerstones of

²Ibid., p. 79.

³Ibid., p. 164.

Soviet doctrine. However, despite the book's emphasis on science, it is vague on how and to what extent technology has changed or made obsolete these key concepts.

Grechko's book is a broad analysis on a variety of topics designed to appeal to a wide audience. Due to the number of issues addressed, the book does not go into great depth on any particular topic with the possible exception of the scientific-technological revolution and its effects on the military. Written during the conservative Brezhnev era, Grechko's book is an example of what might be termed traditional Soviet doctrine. The book should appeal to Western analysts who are seeking examples of Soviet attempts to educate wide segments to educate wide segments of their armed forces.

THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR

BY

S. P. IVANOV

Reviewed by: ERIN K. MARLOW

THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR, by S. P. Ivanov is an extremely important book that uses the historical lessons of World War II (The Great Patriotic War) to describe the importance of the initial period of war, as well as the way in which the initial period of war would be waged by the Soviet Union in the 1970s, 1980s and, if forced, probably today. The author was assigned as the Superintendent of the Academy of the General Staff when this work was published (1972) and it is probably intended for General Officer and military planning staff consumption.

Given the Soviet requirements necessary in order to wage war (economic, political, military and morale viability) it is likely that the Soviets would do everything in their power to avoid war today because the economic, political and morale factors are not up to the required standard. The historical lessons of this book point out what these specific requirements are and when analyzed in light of current East European events the aforementioned proposition becomes clear.

There are a few lessons and/or main points that are repeated throughout the book and an understanding of these lessons is of the utmost importance for the United States/NATO

military planner. One must understand how the opponent is to wage war in order to correctly interpret indications and warnings signals or, more fundamentally, to understand if the conditions, as the Soviets see them, exist which would allow them to wage war.

The first set of lessons allow the author to pay homage to the greatness of the Communist Party (as is required in the Soviet Union to lend credibility to the authenticity and "correctness" of the work) and set the book in the correct context for political acceptability. It is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that is responsible for mobilizing the people of the Soviet Union to repel the "mortal enemy" and will do this via "... vigilance discipline, and development of hatred for the enemy."¹ The government of the Soviet Union may/will be reorganized in order to accomplish this task and this may serve as an initial indicator of malevolent intent. Given the on-going unrest and political upheaval that is taking place within the Soviet Union it is unlikely at this given point in time that the Soviet military leadership would feel confident that the CPSU could deliver on this stated responsibility.

Likewise, the morale and political factors and psychological conditioning of the troops that engage in combat are extremely important to the outcome of the initial period of war. The Soviet system is far superior to that of the West, so Ivanov

¹S. P. Ivanov, The Initial Period of War (Moscow, 1974; Washington, D.C.: GPO. 1986)

believes, because it is based upon the Marxist-Leninist dialectic and is properly managed by the CPSU. Any war would be forced upon the Soviets by a capitalist system and the Soviet response would be the "just war." However the credibility of the Marxist-Lenin system upon which this premise rests is at risk as a whole and it is doubtful that, given the current events in Eastern Europe, as well the recent defeat (or non-win) in Afghanistan, that the people of the Soviet Union that may be subject to conscription would be conducive to this conditioning.

Finally the government and military organs of the Soviet Union will use all means and methods available to include military, political and diplomatic actions to conceal their plans in order to gain time and ensure surprise. This lesson indicates support for the Marxist theory that all facets of Soviet life (political, economic, military and morale) will be involved in the struggle. It also confirms the Western suspicion that "maskirova" and "khitrost" will be used to deny correct information about Soviet intent.

The Soviet intent for a war that would be waged today is to include as many men and equipment as possible in the first attack in order to achieve immediate strategic goals which include gaining air and sea supremacy. All branches of the military will be used as well as the most decisive forms of conducting operations. To the Soviet military mind these decisive forms include splitting the enemy's strategic fronts, encircling large groups of enemy forces, and making deep envelopments with mobile

formations (tanks and armored units) and air power. Because the Soviets place such a high emphasis on gaining air superiority, PVO air defenses will no doubt be strengthened in order to deny the same advantage to the enemy. The Soviet military threat is still a formidable one even today because it holds a nuclear capability and is designed for the strategic offensive defense. Ivanov points out that the most instructive lesson of the initial period of war was the need to conduct an active strategic defense (Which for the Soviets is offensive).²

The book also points out a major stress upon a vital retention of command and control. The Soviet penchant for communications redundancy probably still provide an adequate ability to maintain this capability initially. The final stress is put upon maintaining significant strategic reserves (across the board) that allow for an execution of the strategic defense. As already mentioned this is probably not a reliable source today because the people that make up the reserve are either largely ethnic non-Russian Soviets.

Overall this is a very instructive work that depicts the way in which a true modern Marxist-Leninist would wage war, however the Marxist-Leninist may be a dying breed. Only time will tell.

²Ibid. p. 309.

THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES YESTERDAY AND TODAY

by

V. Ryabov

Reviewed by: ROSS DICKERSON

V. Ryabov's book, The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today, is a description of the Soviet military and the reasons for its existence. It was written in 1976 and was specifically targeted for Western audiences. Ryabov divides his book into four chapters which cover the early years of the Red Army (1917-1922), between the wars (1922-1939), World War Two (1939-1945), and the post-war period (1945-1976). Ryabov's main themes include the following: (1) the need for the Red Army to counter the West's imperialist goals, (2) victory due to Soviet engagement in "just versus unjust wars," (3) the need for a large superior economy based on heavy industry, (5) the right to defend socialism outside the Soviet Union's borders, and (6) the superiority of Soviet military science over all other Western military theories.

Ryabov stresses the need for the Soviet Armed Forces to defend the homeland against imperialist aggressors throughout the book. He constantly emphasizes that the West has attempted to destroy the peace-loving peoples of the Soviet Union from the October Revolution to the present day. The Soviets, of course, have no aggressive intentions and the only reason that the Red Army exists is to protect the Soviet people and the socialist

allies. Ryabov also states that World War Two was a Western conspiracy to weaken and/or destroy the Soviet Union, and he claims that the West did little (even in the Pacific Theater) to aid the Soviet Union in ending the war. He claims it was the Soviet victories in China that forced Japan to surrender. "The atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki . . . did not influence the course of the war."¹

Ryabov attributes all Red Army victories to the fact that the Soviets fought just wars. He does not, however, digress into a dialectic of just and unjust wars as does some other Soviet literature.² This appears to be an attempt to avoid excessive rhetoric and maintain the interest of the potential Western reader.

Throughout the book Ryabov emphasizes the Soviet need for a large army backed up with massive quantities of reserves and supplies. This theme was mentioned in every chapter and is indicative of the Soviet military experience throughout history as well as an explanation to the West for the current size of the Soviet military. Ryabov consistently reassures the reader that the enormous size of the Soviet military is strictly for defense against all potential imperialist aggressors.]

The need for a large economy based on heavy industry is also

¹Ryabov, V. The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976): 114.

²Ryabov, 29, 37. References concerning just wars of the defense of the homeland and the proletariat are usually taken from V.I. Lenin's Collected Works.

mentioned throughout the book. This compliments the Soviet desire for a large standing army with large reserves and supplies-- all are indicative of the past Soviet military experience.

Another theme Ryabov stresses throughout the book is the Soviet right to defend socialism outside the Soviet borders. He states that the "Soviet soldiers crossed the border not as invaders and enslavers, but as liberators. . . ." ³ He also states that the Soviet Union is on the best of terms with their Eastern European friends. There is (as can be expected) no mention of the 180,000 square miles the Soviet Union annexed during World War II excluding the subjugation of Eastern Europe. ⁴

Finally, Ryabov emphasizes the superiority of Soviet military science over "the much-lauded military theories of Nazi Germany." ⁵ This theme, common in Soviet literature, is actually applied to all Western military theories since Ryabov lumps the Wehrmacht in with all imperialist armies.

The reader must beware not to make a hasty conclusion that Ryabov considers the Soviet Union to be a major naval power. He mentions this only once, and all subsequent references to sailors in the book portray the Soviet Navy's participation in

³Ryabov, 98.

⁴Russel Stolfi, notes from "History of Europe, 1914-1950," 29 November 1989, Naval Postgraduate School. The areas annexed also included 23 million people.

⁵Ryabov, 124.

ground campaigns only.⁶

This book, because it was written for Western dissemination, is significantly different from Soviet literature published specifically for Soviet readers. The book is easy to read and understand for two primary reasons: it is set up in a Western-style format, and it keeps to a minimum the normally massive amounts of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. This book also de-emphasizes the use of nuclear weapons, offensive strategies, and it does not excessively attack Western and U.S. policies in the usual Soviet fashion.

In conclusion, The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today appears to be written to thoroughly convince the West of the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions and the Red Army's historic and honorable history. For all of the above mentioned reasons and the fact that the book is written on a very basic doctrinal level, The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today is recommended only as an overview of how the Soviet's view their own army's history and interaction with the West since 1917 as well as an introduction to basic and over-simplified Soviet ideas on military doctrine written exclusively to influence the Western reader.

⁶Ryabov, 20.

THE COMMAND AND STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY AIR FORCE IN
THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945

by

M. N. KOZHEVNIKOV

Reviewed by: SUSAN L. THEODORELOS

Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. 70,000 copies were printed and with the intent to demonstrate the activities of the Soviet Army Air Force during the Great Patriotic War and the role of Stavka in coordinating operations.

"When Germany suddenly launched a massive attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet Air Force units in the western border were caught in the midst of an extensive rearmament program."¹ Forced on the defensive, the Soviet Air Force command and staff elements hastily instituted a reorganization of the Soviet Army Air Force to counter the rapidly advancing Germans. As a result, the valuable combat experience was to prove invaluable in the conduct of future air operations. The key was centralization.

This is the author's main thesis throughout the book. Kozhevnikov was a member of the VVS command and staff during the Great Patriotic War which provided first hand and insightful

¹pg. vii

information regarding the operations and tactics used, problems with those operations and tactics and the resulting solutions.

The book is divided into seven chapters that trace the progression of the war through the consolidation of the Army Air Force to the Battle of Kursk and the Concluding Period of the War. The last chapter is dedicated to the Far East emphasizing the preparations for combat and combat actions in 1945.

The book is, literally, "littered" with numbers of tanks, motorized divisions, aircraft bombers and fighters perhaps to further emphasize the use of tactics but this makes for very difficult reading. Additionally, throughout the book are the obligatory salutations to the "heros," and honorable mentions of the staff and leadership.

In a nutshell, the specific lessons learned can be broken down into five items (1) the predictions and fundamental premises of Soviet Military Art regarding VVS employment were confirmed. Strategic air supremacy was vital to create favorable conditions for ground and naval forces in major operations by groups of fronts simultaneously. As well the premise of prewar Soviet Military Art show two forms of struggle, daily fighting and VVS air ops to destroy enemy air groupings. (2) Soviet Air Force "operational art" was enriched by a new form of frontal aviation combat called the air offensive. This was deemed necessary to provide continuous air support to advancing troops. Special attentions is given to aviation actions in encirclement operations by ground troops. These were used to isolate large

groups, encircle the enemy and prevent resupply by air. This information would have proved useful for the Berlin Blockade. (3) Soviet Military Art solved the problem of using long range aviation in the war by using independent air operations verses previous isolated strikes. (4) Soviet Military Art solved the problem of tactical coordination of aviation with ground units and formations. Strategic offensive operations were coordinated by Stavka while operation coordination was handled by the front commanders. (5) Finally, Soviet Military Art solved the problem of controlling aviation. Front aviation air armies were found viable because they permitted commanders to control all aviation at their disposal centrally and satisfy the requirements for efficient coordination with ground troops.

The author claims that further study is necessary to better organize and conduct battle for strategic air supremacy, massing aviation efforts in ground force sectors and organizing VVS coordination with ground force and the Navy with the Senior air chief.

This is book that one would have to read two or three times in order to wade through the extraneous names and numbers to really get down to the substance of how the Great Patriotic War changed the way Soviets approach aviation management. As mentioned before, centralization is the key.

THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES: A HISTORY OF THEIR
ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

by

S.A. TYUSHKEVICH

Reviewed by: TOM CHASSEE

The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of Their Organizational Development: Is a book written primarily for domestic Soviet consumption by both Soviet officers and enlisted men. The book was written to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the sixtieth anniversary of the creation of the Soviet armed forces. It is concerned primarily with the problems attending the growth and development of the Soviet Armed Forces and links these changes with the economic, sociopolitical, scientific-technological, and internal changes that have concurrently occurred in the USSR.

The authors cite on of the most important periods in the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces as being the years between the two world wars. This period uncovers the first major theme of the book, that being the definition of the offensive as the main and decisive form of combat. This idea of the offensive was manifested in the concept of the "deep thrust." "Deep trust" is understood to mean the simultaneous annihilation, neutralization, and containment not only of those defending troops supposed to repel a frontal attack, but also of those

troops stationed in the enemy's operational depth.¹ Additionally, that success in these operations would be attained by the combined efforts of all services and branches of the armed forces. In these deep operations motorized and tank formations would play the decisive role with double echeloned groups of 30 to 40 tanks per kilometer of breakthrough gap in the sector of the main thrust. The breakthrough exploitation echelon of this operation would then exploit the tactical success into operational depth. The authors site the first use of a "deep thrust" operation as occurring in 1939 against the Japanese army in the Khalka river region of the Soviet Far East. The resulting crushing military defeat of the Japanese forces was of great military and political importance, it compromised Japan's military status, and she was obliged to review her strategic plans.

The concept of the offensive was further developed during the Great Patriotic War. Although, the authors admit that due to the Soviet Unions unpreparedness at the out break of hostilities an initial period of strategic defense followed by the use of counter-offensives occurred before strategic offensives were conducted. It is during this period that the authors bring forth another key theme, that being the Soviet Unions superior productive capacity enabled it to conduct counter-offensives and ultimately strategic offensives to bring

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about Germanies defeat. From November 1942 through December 1943 this productive capacity enabled an irreversible trend in the correlation of forces, causing the Soviet Army to gain a two fold superiority over German forces in tanks and artillery, and threefold in aircraft. This superior correlation of forces enabled the Soviet Union to seek a decisive turning point in the war, which was provided by the counter-offensives at Stalingrad and Kursk. By 1944 the correlation of forces ultimately reaches a four fold superiority in guns, three fold in tanks, and eight fold in aircraft.

The point is then made that by Soviet industry being able to improve the quality and quantity of equipment of the ground forces, enabled the conduct of large scale offensive operations. Conducted by group of fronts, directed toward attainment of decisive goals. These strategic operations made it possible to select the most advantageous axes and time, assure the element of surprise, pin down the enemy's reserves, force ones plans on him, and maintain a firm hold on the strategic initiative. The authors give the ultimate example of the art of strategic leadership as the 1945 Soviet Campaign in the Far East, stating that this campaign was unparalleled during World War II. That it was an offensive campaign conducted on a 5000 kilometer front at a depth of 600 to 800 kilometers and smashed the Japanese Kwantung Army in 25 days.

During the period of the Great Patriotic War the authors also make special mention of the great contribution to securing a

decisive change in the war made by the Soviet partisans. That by 1943 they were occupying the attention of 25 German divisions. This may be a plug for Soviet airborne forces which would accomplish a similar mission of interdicting and occupying enemy forces in the rear, preventing their use at the front.

The chapters covering the post war development of the Soviet Armed Forces begin with two quotes, one made by President Truman "We are now in possession of a weapon that will not only revolutionize war but can alter the course of history and civilization," and the second by General Maxwell Taylor "That in the atomic bomb we had the absolute weapon which would permit the United States, its sole possessor, to police the world through the threat of its use." These two quotes, made by Americans, would certainly seem to epitomize the importance that the Soviets give to the possession, and potential use of nuclear weapons. The authors state that an important aspect of military technological progress during the first postwar years was that the Soviets develop and test their own nuclear missiles. This would enable a Soviet accomplishment in the revolution of military affairs, thwart aggressive plans of imperialism, preserve peace, and strengthen the position of socialism.

The Soviets then envisioned a future war which would be waged between two diametrically opposed social systems, coalitional, world wide in scope, and waged with nuclear missiles. Additionally, Soviet military doctrine dictated that nuclear missiles ensured future wars would be of short duration.

With the advent of nuclear weapons the authors observe that tanks and infantry combat vehicles (ICV's) still occupy an important place in the ground forces armament system. They state that tanks and ICV's armor makes them resistant to shock waves, protects the crews from penetrating radiation, and that they can promptly exploit the results of nuclear bursts. The importance of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) is also emphasized. The authors stating that the SRF's are the principal and decisive means of achieving the goals of war, by undermining an aggressors military and economic potential, annihilating his strategic means of nuclear attack, and destroying his main military groupings.

The book's mention of the Soviet Navy's role, at least until the end of the Great Patriotic War, is one of supporting the ground forces in the combined arms concept. Although, the authors do make mention that the experience of World War II confirmed the great importance of Naval forces. With the post World War II revolution caused by the introduction of nuclear weapons, the book sites an even greater increase in the importance of Naval forces. The authors state that during this period of the position of the USSR as a great sea power missile submarines and aircraft armed with nuclear missiles becoming the main striking force of the Soviet navy.² The authors conclude that the relative importance of the Soviet navy has risen considerably as befits the status of the USSR as a great sea

²Ibid., p. 415.

power,³ and that the Soviet navy can exert a very significant and at times decisive influence on the course of war.

One of the curious omissions I found in the book was the lack of mention concerning the use of chemical and biological weapons, either by the Soviet Armed Forces or the imperialists. There may be a significant rational behind this omission, or the authors may have grouped their use with the employment of nuclear weapons.

This book gives a broad overview and chronological development of all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces including the important doctrine and concepts governing their use. As such it would be a useful book for anyone needing a quick grounding and one book reference concerning the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

³Ibid., p. 165.

LOCAL WAR - HISTORY AND THE PRESENT DAY

by

I. Ye. Sharov

Reviewed by: CARL R. GRAHAM

Local War came out in an edition of 30,000 copies and was expressly written for scientific workers, teachers, and propagandists. This suggests that the book was written as an official version or explanation of past events, as well as a possible justification for Soviet actions of the period. These events and activities include arms programs and Soviet involvement either directly or by proxy in local wars throughout the world.

The book examines trends and developments of local wars from the 19th century through the later 1970s. Its stated purpose is to seek useful lessons from case studies of particular wars e.g. Arab/Israeli conflicts, Korea, and Vietnam. These lessons can then be used to document the decay of the Imperialist system and perhaps provide lessons for the Socialist camp. Shavrov gives many tools to aid in the search for these lessons, leading the reader down a path to the author's own inevitable conclusions, even though many of his conclusions seem to be implied rather than stated.

Shavrov begins by defining local war in terms of its scope and content. Local wars, he says, are limited in the scale of

their operations. Limitation may be by geographic area, level of commitment, or both. This rather simplistic definition foreshadows the superficial level of analysis apparent throughout the book. The role of goals, for instance, is not addressed in this definition. Limited capability and fear of escalation are likewise omitted as factors that will narrow the scope of war.

Shavrov also reiterates the Soviet concepts of "just" war. This, of course, is a precursor to explaining why Imperialist wars are "unjust" and wars waged by the revolutionaries of social justice are and will continue to be "just."

The book is an obvious propaganda work replete with the often used phrases, historical analyses, and offerings to the Party so common to Soviet literature. It sets up local war and war in general as a last gasp attempt of the Imperialist to maintain their system. He points to the USSR as the savior of the Socialist camp, pointing out that since the Soviets achieved their nuclear capability the Western nations have been much more careful in their attempts to influence world events through force. But beyond the obvious propaganda effort there seems to be an attempt to justify some local wars and legitimize increased military capability as a deterrent. Shavrov implicitly makes these latter points through careful structuring of his arguments and selective use of historical analogy.

Shavrov's structure examines local war in two contexts. The first is under the principles of historicism. This is the concept that local war is a movement from one historical stage to

another. The second context paints local wars as "links in a single chain of expansionist desires characterizing the strategy of the struggle of Imperialism with the progressive forces of our planet." This second context goes one step beyond the first by not only stressing the inevitability of change towards Socialism, but also the evil intentions of the Imperialist bloc to maintain their own system at all costs. One of these costs, he asserts, has been local wars.

Shavrov goes on to identify two major rationale for local war. The first is as a proving ground for Imperialist weapons and methods. He cites numerous cases prior to WWI and WWII where Western nations engaged in local wars to test new developments in machine guns, tanks, etc.

The second rationale for Imperialist nations to resort to local war is to gain a foothold against the inevitable tide of Socialism. Revolutionary movements throughout the world have been opposed by the reactionary forces in an attempt to stem the tide of social progress. He paints local war as a last ditch effort - politics by other means, to coin a phrase - to resist change and perpetuate the capitalist system through force.

The author implicitly identifies several roles the USSR must play to maintain its leadership of the Socialist bloc and prevail in the great social struggle. The first of these is to preserve Socialism by beating back the U.S. and its allies with the Soviets own nuclear capability. Shavrov identifies the Soviet's credible nuclear capability as a watershed in the Imperialists'

trend of resorting to local wars. It is interesting to note that this book was written during the earlier stages of the Soviet nuclear modernization program, during which virtually all classes of missiles were upgraded.

The second role Shavrov identifies for the Soviet Union is to aid revolutionary causes in their own "just" wars, including support of national revolution. This is probably a move to extinguish any questions that may have come up following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, as well as justify prior incursions of Soviet troops into other nations for the "just" causes of preserving or encouraging social progress. Shavrov is careful to point out that war is legitimate on the side of the repressed party regardless of whether it is offensive or defensive. This legitimizes such blatantly offensive actions as Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

These roles for the Soviet Union point out an interesting paradox in the book. Shavrov takes great pains to deride the West for its successful use of power projection. The U.S. Navy is particularly highlighted in this role. But while he criticizes the goals of this capability, he seems to be very impressed with the means. This leaves the reader with the impression that he is advocating a power projection capability for the Soviet Navy. The fact that the Ivan Rogov and conventional carrier were being built or deployed during this period no doubt reinforced this impression in the west.

All in all this was an interesting book with many lessons, even though many of them have been overcome by events. It now seems evident, for instance, that the Soviets do not see a power projection role for their navy in the near future. Also, the concepts of interventionism, whether "just" or "unjust," have taken a back seat to economic rebuilding in the political leadership of the Soviet Union. I would not throw this book away just yet, though. It contains much of the Marxist/Leninist justification for power projection and intervening actions that may be pursued later if Soviet economic problems are dealt with and their leadership once again looks outward.

ALWAYS PREPARED TO DEFEND THE FATHERLAND

by

N.V. Ogarkov

Reviewed by: JACQUELINE MAHER

"Always Prepared To Defend The Fatherland" was written by Marshal Ogarkov, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, and signed to press on 26 Jan 1982. The purpose of this book is to emphasize and gain support for Marshal Ogarkov's thesis of the "objective necessity of further strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet State."¹ Other themes addressed include the necessary directions of organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces, methods to increase combat readiness, and several significant problems with the development of Soviet Military Art.² There were 100,000 copies put to print, signifying an intended large audience.

Marshal Ogarkov cites the increasing Imperialist threat, both in general and specifically, as the need to increase the Soviet defence capability. these threats include the desire on the part of Imperialist circles (i.e. the United States and Europe) for world supremacy, halting the world revolution, and ultimately eradicating socialism. Specifically, he states that the United States has not implemented arms agreements, halted talks,

¹N.V. Ogarkov, Always Prepared To Defend The Fatherland, 1st (JPRS 1/10412, 25 March 1982), p. 1.

²Ibid.

intervened in domestic the affairs of foreign nations, and more importantly, the United States has sought to redress the military balance by starting an arms race that threatens to lead to a third world war.³ To counter these threats, Marshal Ogarkov believes that the Soviet Union must move beyond a purely defensive posture.

With this as his premise, Marshal Ogarkov makes a valid argument for the reorganization and for the buildup of the Soviet Armed Forces. Although the Soviet Union is by nature and practice a peace loving nation, Ogarkov points to the beginning of the Great Patriotic war as an example of the cost and the vulnerability of maintaining a strictly defensive strategy. In order to prevent a repetition of this and to prevent another world war, Ogarkov promotes deterrence through strength.

The most important organizational development change proposed by Ogarkov is the idea of groups of fronts vice single fronts. The disadvantages of the single front approach were made apparent in the Great Patriotic War. Upon completion of a front operation, pauses would occur - sometimes quite lengthy, and frequent a protracted period of preparation for the next front operation. Two major deficiencies with this approach are the gross inefficient use of time and the insufficient ability to achieve large scale military-political objectives.

Both of these flaws are remedied by the groups of fronts approach. This approach requires coordination and planning of

³Ibid., p. 4-5/

several fronts operating simultaneously. "In the course of such an operation each front can conduct two or more front operations in succession, with brief pauses, and even without pauses."⁴ The TVD, Theatre/Strategic Operation, is the embodiment of this concept and is the principal form of military action today.

Ogarkov addresses several problems which plague the development of Soviet Military Art and reflect his dissatisfaction with present military conditions. The primary complaint deals with the stagnation of views and the implementation of new systems. Tied in with this problem is the view that weapons capabilities, not doctrine or strategy, is most important when it comes to the development of the art of warfare.⁵ Another problem that exists is the fact that modern weapons make surprise attacks possible, demanding greater flexibility and efficiency of leadership by commanders and their staffs. Other areas where there is room for improvement include: the need for more and better rear services, allocation of resources by services, branch and TVD, and finally, the need to improve the training of officer cadres.⁶

Marshal Ogarkov's book "Always Prepared To Defend The Fatherland" is a well written, incisive look at the defense needs of the Soviet Union. During the time this book was written, Brezhnev's doctrine of nuclear deterrence was still in existence.

⁴Ibid., p. 25.

⁵Ibid., p. 22.

⁶Ibid., pp. 26-36.

Marshal Ogarkov rejects the use of nuclear weapons and argues successfully in favor of the development of conventional weapons and forces. He correctly criticizes Soviet leadership because of the lack of ability to change and grow with the times. However, the one criticism of this book is that he does not even address the question of political control over military decisions. Ultimately Ogarkov is removed from office in 1984. Ironically, Gorbachev comes to power in 1985 and embraces these very ideas, which he continues today, thereby validating Ogarkov's arguments. This book is extremely informative and applicable to the situation in the Soviet Union today. It is highly recommended to all audiences.

THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

by

V.V. Zagladin

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Reviewed by: RUTH M. ROSS

The fourth edition of The World Communist Movement, signed to press on 17 April 1982, is the collective work of several authors edited by Professor V. V. Zagladin, Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. What you would expect in this document is the party line on the world communist movement. With few surprises, that is what Zagladin delivers.

This comprehensive work describes the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the world communist movement and examines in detail all components of the movement, including the communist parties, the revolutionary working class and its allies, and countries of various levels of development involved in socialization.

Through the book, several themes emerge that seem to tie all its elements together. The primary underlying theme is man's inevitable revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism and communism, realized through a course of tense class struggle. This is the foundation belief of the world communist movement, based on the teachings of Marxist-Leninism. Every aspect of the book is tied together by this basic principle.]

A second theme prevalent in the book is the imperialist threat to the social revolution. V. P. Iyerrusalimskiy, one of

the authors, lists "weapons" in the imperialists' arsenal against the socialist movement. These include "attempts at military pressure on world communism; ...an endeavor to play on mistakes and miscalculations in socialist building;...use of international trade as a means of political pressure;...the organization of counterrevolutionary coups and intervention; and attempts to undermine the unity of the world communist movement."¹

Another main theme is the communist movement as the vanguard of the liberation struggle of the working class. The communist movement, for example, is the only political force operating in all detachments of the revolutionary process. Another role of the party as the vanguard of the movement, is the tremendous role in the process of revolutionary training of the working class. It must educate the working classes so the people can take power into their own hands under party guidance.²

A final theme in the book was a caution message to the communist parties, reminding them that their strength comes from their constant fidelity to Marxist-Leninist principles. "Experience has shown that every time the party has weakened and departed from the Leninist organizational principles, whether it be under the pretext of liberalizing or democratizing them, it has ultimately lost influence and harmed the revolutionary

¹V. V. Zagladin, ed., The World Communist (JPRS-UPS-84-034-L, 1984), 8.

²Ibid., 49.

process in the nation."³ Ye. V. Dobrotin, one of the authors, stresses "unity in principle and diversity in particulars."⁴ The Marxist-Leninist basic principles must remain firm, but the detail and the methods of the communist movement in a country must be adjusted to the particular revolutionary situation.

How does this book fit into the context of its times? It was written in 1982, perhaps the best of times for the world communist movement. The book is optimistic, pointing out the then recent revolutions in Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua; the ouster of the monarchical regime in Iran; and movements toward socialism in Grenada.

According to a 1987 RAND study, Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection, the Soviets entered a new phase of power projection in the early 1980's.⁵ The World Communist Movement was written before these changes were evident. One chapter, however, did reflect changing times. The chapter on "Communists and the Struggle for Peace" is updated significantly from a chapter entitled "Development of the World Revolutionary Process and Problems of War and Peace" in the 1973 edition of this book.⁶ "Communists and the Struggle for Peace" addresses

³Ibid., 398.

⁴Ibid., 445.

⁵Francis Fukayama, Scott Bruckner, and Sally Stoecker, Soviet Political Perspectives on Power Projection (Santa Monica: RAND, 1987), 32-36.

⁶V. V. Zagladin, ed., The World Communist Movement (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973).

the effects of detente on the world communist movement. I.S. Kremer, author of the chapter, explains that detente creates more favorable conditions for the World revolutionary process. With detente, socialist countries can direct more resources to the movement, and the imperialists are not as likely to conduct military intervention to counter the movement's actions.

Is this book relevant today? After the setbacks suffered by socialist movements since this book was written, several communist arguments for socialist revolution no longer seem valid. Two specific points are economics and nationalism, with socialism proclaimed as a solution to problems in both of these. On economics, Ye. S. Ambartsumov stated, "Dynamic and stable development of the socialist world is an important advantage over the capitalist system," and on nationalism, he said, "It is true that manifestatins of...nationalism do occur in the local areas of some countries; but they are successfully overcome if the ruling communist party remains true to the principles of proletarian socialist internationalism and the Leninist policy of friendship among peoples."⁷ In areas of economics and nationalism, the USSR has lost its credibility, not able to live up to what it promises other countries.

In its time, however, the book fulfilled the expectations of its audience. The fourth edition of a standard ideological document, it described all aspects of the world communist

⁷Zagladin, The World Communist Movement, 63-64.

movement. Ninety-five thousand copies of this edition were printed in Russian. Previous editions reportedly won the recognition of the Soviet public and were translated into foreign languages.

This book is a political not military piece, and its wide dissemination was designed for a political audience. It was undoubtedly written for communist party members in the USSR who are involved in the spread of world communism. In foreign translations, it is a must-read book for the leaders of the many international communist and workers' parties, whose responsibility it is to bring about the socialist revolution.

PROGRESS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE USSR

by

M. M. Kir'yan

Reviewed by: ROBERT E. CLARK II

The improvement in weapons systems and the rise of technology as an instrument of military improvement has over the years yielded changes in Soviet Military Science and as an end result the Socio-Political aspects of waging war. Lieutenant General M. M. Kir'yan traces the rise of military technology from the Soviet Civil War period until the early 1980's and incorporates it into various changes involving Soviet military strategy. It is important to stress that technology affects strategy and not doctrine which as Lt. General Kir'yan notes is not a function of hardware but a framework that evolves from the Communist party and Soviet state and is prioritized and dictated by the Communist Party Of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Along with the evolution of military technology there are some important themes in the book that reflect the military strategy of the time (the late Brezhnev era), such as "offensive defense" and "correlation of forces", and give the reader insight into the Soviet military mind as well as the Soviets use of available technology. Though some themes discovered in the book are outdated or refuted by the events of the past five years, the book allows the reader to follow the thought and reasoning process of the Soviets that form

military strategy. In a time when there is a lot of debate in the Soviet Union concerning military strategy and defensive sufficiency it is imperative to understand the thought process that is involved if one is to understand the results that emerge. This book gives the reader such insight.

The book is written in a very chronological manner which guides the reader through every detail of military technological advances from the early 1900's thru the early 1980's. The Soviets are constantly portrayed as survivors. Lt. General Kir'yan illustrates throughout the book the Soviets ability to use what resources are available to their maximum potential and prepare for and win wars. The Soviets ability to use what resources are they have to successfully prepare and fight a war is projected by Lt. General Kir'yan into a hypothetical nuclear conflict in which they emerge successful. The theme that nuclear war is winnable was an important theme of the Brezhnev era as seen in the development and employment of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system which conceded partial nuclear penetration. The idea of winning a nuclear war, as well as nuclear war itself, has been denounced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and the present day CPSU.

The most significant technological advances within the Soviet Union as expressed by Lt. General Kir'yan was the advent of aircraft (planes and missiles) and nuclear weapons. As a result of their development Soviet military strategy was

transformed in order to incorporate their capabilities. The emergence of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) as the premier military service is an example of the importance placed on the employment of nuclear missiles by the Soviets. Though the SRF is at the pinnacle of the Soviet military hierarchy Lt. General Kir'yan stressed the importance of force correlation with respect to achieving a tactical goal. The correlation of forces versus the concentration of forces was expressed as the key to conflict success. Conflicts as well as wars were expected to be short duration due to the power and speed of present day weapons and weapons systems. Besides correlation of forces another theme that was repeated in the book was the Soviets Strategy of an offensive defense. Lt. General Kir'yan emphasized that defense consisted of inflicting damage to an enemies nuclear and conventional forces prior to those forces being employed against the Soviet Union.¹ Present day writings suggest that the Soviets may be adapting a more conventional view of defense.

The book expresses the importance of proper targeting, especially with respect to nuclear weapons. Lt. General Kir'yan's discussion of avoiding economic areas in a nuclear exchange has caused some analysts to suggest a possible Soviet reference to

¹M. Kir'yan, Progress In Military Technology And The Armed Forces Of The USSR (Moscow, Soviet Union: Military Publishing House, 1982), p. 320.

the feasibility of a limited nuclear war.² There is no other evidence, in fact the Soviets refute the possibility of a limited nuclear war, in the literature to support this. I feel Lt. General Kir'yan is talking purely in a sense of resource conservation versus nuclear escalation, for nowhere is it inferred that once a conflict goes nuclear it won't escalate.

Along with the Military Publishing House translation of the book I also read the JPRS L/1108 translation (book excerpts) dated 24 January 1983, and a review of the book by Ms. Sharon Houy. I found no major differences in content between the two translations. The major themes I have discussed in my review were apparent in both translations. The review by Ms. Houy was very accurate in its assessment of the major points that I feel Lt. General Kir'yan was trying to express, but I feel she fell short in her conclusion. Ms. Houy calls the book an "excellent source on how Soviet military doctrine has changed to reflect new capabilities brought about through technical progress." The fact of the matter is that the book reflects changes in military strategy as a result of technological advances, not changes in doctrine. Lt. General Kir'yan makes it clear in the introduction that doctrine is an output of CPSU policy and then evolves military strategy throughout the book as a function of technology in the bounds of military doctrine as dictated by the CPSU.

²Edward Warner, "Soviet Concepts And Capabilities For Limited Nuclear War," Rand Note, Prepared for the USAF, Santa Monica, Ca. Feb. 1989.

Though the Soviet Union is in a dynamic state and many of the central themes of the book may have changed, or been refuted, the book is still invaluable in that it gives you an insight into how the higher level Soviet mind thinks. The Soviet's do not think like westerners and it is imperative if we are to logically assess the changes, that are occurring and what they may mean, that we do so from a Soviet perspective.

MARXIST-LENINIST TEACHING
ON WAR AND THE ARMY

by

D.A. VOLKOGONOV, Ed.

Reviewed by: MARVIN KNORR, JR.

The book, Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and The Army, is a good view of Soviet thinking prior to Gorbachev. It is an update of the 1972 version edited by the same officer and makes partial use of materials from the book "war and the Army" published in 1977. There were 16 collective authors who range in rank from colonel to lieutenant general.

The book is arduous to read. Part of the difficulty is the premise that all the problems of the world are caused by capitalism. The world can only be made better through Communism, which will provide a pure, benign environment in which the workers of the world can unite.

The book, on the other hand, provides valuable understanding into Soviet Military Doctrine. The object of the study is the military-political practice of classes and states. Because of it's complexity, it cannot be embraced by a single science. The principle ones are:¹

1. Military-special approach/technological approach -- their objective is to reveal the specific laws governing the preparations made by states and armed forces for war. This is the only one that the bourgeois military science

¹p. 204

This is the only one that the bourgeois military science is capable of understanding.

2. Philosophical-sociological/class-political -- their immediate object is to reveal the social nature and social significance of military-political practice from the positions of a particular class.

Ironically, the Soviet meaning of peace make quite clear their views of the capitalism with the following definitions:

"Communists openly declare that their goals may be attained only by the overthrow of the capitalist structure."²

"Only the triumph of socialism throughout the world will finally exclude the causes of war from the life of human society."³

As shown above, it is important to understand Soviet meanings or definitions because they may differ from our definitions or ways of thinking and have a unique twist to them.

The authors examine the economic, social, spiritual, scientific, military and political factors as they relate to the total make up of the potential military power of the whole state. They sum up the military potential of war as follows:

"Being a continuation of policy by violent means, war is not only a collision between armed forces but also a struggle in politics, economics and ideology. An armed struggle is the decisive characteristic of war, it is its unique feature; however, war is not limited to it alone."⁴

They go on to explain the following ideas: (1) The Principles of Classification of Wars (2) The Four Main Types of War (3) Just and Unjust Wars and (4) Peaceful Coexistence.

²p. 67

³p. 43

⁴p. 152

Of particular interest is the authors' definition of Military Science as the boundary between the social, natural and technical branches of scientific knowledge. The concept of Military Science possesses a General Theory and is composed of the theory of the Art of War, which is the core of Military Science; and, ow the Art of War is made up of the Theory of Strategy, of Operational Art, and of Tactics. Soviet Military Science is so cultivated that is has to predict the military-technical nature of a possible war; its scale and the methods of combat activities. Military History plays such an important role in Military Science that its study is the sole purpose of linking together the laws governing the Development of the Art of War and the Development of the Armed Forces and Military Training.

The authors talk minimally about nuclear war and say nuclear missile war deeply influences the possibility of both its occurrence and its prevention. The authors, near the end of Chapter Two, conclude with the following statement:

"The Soviet Union and its armed forces have no recourse other than to be in constant readiness to decisively repel the aggressor, using all forms of modern weapons at their disposal, including nuclear. Use of nuclear weapons in response to their use by an aggressor does not diminish the justice of the war fought by the state opposing the aggressor."⁵

The undertones of the book lead one to believe that the Soviets would employ nuclear weapons if it were to their advantage.

⁵p. 36

The book was reviewed by an outside source, Soviet Colonel V. T. Login.⁶ His conclusions state the book contains three main parts: (1) war and its historical fate (2) the army and society, 3) and the factors of war and military organizational development. He indicates the book has been substantially reworked from the original.

It is interesting to see in this book as well as other Soviet writings the Marxist's outlook on the origin, causes and essence of wars. The reviewer, Col. Login, summed it up:

With the appearance of an antagonistic class society, its permanent accomplice, war, arose ... the source of war, its genesis resides in the very exploiting system based up on private ownership of the means of production and the suppression of the workers."

Col. Login was disappointed that the authors did not analyze the Anglo-Argentine conflict in 1982 as an example of modern imperialist war and show the aggressive role of U.S. imperialism in it. Of great interest, as Col. Login explains, is the chapter devoted to an analysis of historical wars for the defense of the socialist fatherland, as a particular type of just war. Stating:

"The theses and conclusions of the chapter are of great importance in understanding the measures being taken by the CPSU, the Soviet government and the socialist nations to defend the victories of socialism under conditions where the imperialists have proclaimed a "crusade" against the USSR and the other socialist countries. A knowledge of these wars make it possible to predict the development of military events, to correctly assess the nature of the wars being prepared by the imperialists, the methods of their initiation and conduct to correctly organize the training of the troops and naval forces to repel possible aggression."

⁶Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No. 8, Aug. 85, pp. 85-87 -- JPRS-UMA-86-003 14 JAN. 86.

He concludes his review saying:

"The book makes a substantial contribution to a further elaboration of Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning war and the army and will be a useful aid for officers, officer candidates and students in the higher military schools in increasing their ideological-theoretical level (of understanding Communist thought)."

M.V.FRUNZE, MILITARY THEORIST

by

M. A. Gareev

Reviewed by: ALLAN C. POLLEY

M.V. Frunze, Military Theorist concerns the life and work of one of the most prominent early figures of the Communist party and Soviet state. Because of his efforts in the development of Soviet military theory, and because of his devoted leadership, Frunze is known as the "Father of the Red Army." Col. Gen. Gareev, significantly writing as one of the powerful deputy chiefs of the Soviet General Staff, provides an analysis of the military theoretical heritage of Frunze from a modern perspective. As such, this book provides insight into current Soviet military thinking.

This current perspective is best illustrated by a passage that Western analysts should commit to memory. On pages 94-95 (Pergamon-Brassey's ed.), Gareev repudiates the notion that nuclear weapons have changed the nature of war, flatly stating that war remains a continuation of politics by violent means. Regardless of the weapons used, war will always remain essentially a class struggle. Gareev continues by saying that although the Soviets favor excluding war from the world and feel that nuclear war is inadmissible, they nevertheless must be prepared for a retaliatory nuclear strike in the event the imperialists launch a nuclear attack. Despite the catastrophic consequences of this action, to

do otherwise would represent a capitulation to the forces of aggression.

By providing the reader with the historical background of Frunze's childhood, early development, military successes, organization and training of the armed forces, and establishment of the Soviet defense industry, Gareev shows Frunze to be a serious student of military history, military theory and military affairs, always striving to analyze the past, identify strengths and weaknesses and push military theory forward. His concern was not where military theory had been, but where it should go. While Frunze's studiousness, it is continually stressed that his devotion to, and correct application of, Marxist-Leninist teachings is what enabled him to think so clearly, allowing him to understand Clausewitz's limitations and build on what was rational. In this manner, Gareev illustrates that Marxist-Leninist theory is as valid today as it was in Frunze's time. Gareev also points out that today's officers must continue the work by acquiring military knowledge and the creative analysis of it. (pg. 331) Frunze's efforts are to serve as an example.

Another important theme is that Frunze understood that the revolution could not be won by solely military means, but recognized that war is composed of armed, economic, ideological and diplomatic struggles. Simply defeating the enemy on the battlefield was not a guarantee of political victory. The enemy must be defeated in all four areas. A professional soldier must therefore devote himself not only to the armed struggle, but to an

understanding of all four struggles. Frunze addressed the economic struggle by devoting effort to the fledgling Soviet defense industry. Frunze believed that preparation for war must extend to all levels of society and involves full mobilization of the state. Again, this applies Marxist-Leninist doctrine to the military on all levels. Political and military-technological considerations should be organically fused, as they form the two parts of military doctrine (pg. 104). Frunze recognized that the organization of armies and the methods employed by them for the conduct of battle were dependent upon material, or economic, conditions.

In another theme, Gareev shows that Frunze's advocacy of the offensive, and the success he had with it as a military commander when faced with poor odds, led to his development of the Unitary Military Doctrine, in which an army should be trained throughout in a spirit of offensiveness, united by ideology. When Gareev wrote this book (1984) this attitude still prevailed as he wrote that in the nuclear age, the initial period of the war is likely to be "the main and decisive period which largely predetermines the outcome of the entire war" (pg. 214). This statement, which seems to imply that a first strike could be considered, almost immediately follows statements that Soviet policy opposes any use of nuclear weapons (but would use them to retaliate against a nuclear attack), that Soviet policy is not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons, and that Soviet military policy is strictly defensive in nature. It is well to note that Gareev points out that of 210 Front operations in the Great

Patriotic War, 160 were defensive. Thus the Soviets can be expected to employ the offensive in the defense.

Gareev's work provides the reader of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy with a revised outlook on the Soviet perspective of nuclear war. While he feels that Sokolovskiy was "generally correct," he feels that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the West's improved conventional weapons have again altered the likely form of war, making it necessary to prepare for a protracted war.

This book was probably intended to stimulate military thought among Soviet military officers. It should do the same among U.S. military officers. Frunze's effort at divining military theory is an example to anyone who considers himself a military professional. His depth of devotion, if truly depicted in this book, can be considered legendary. Frunze forms the wellspring from which Soviet military theory bursts. Clausewitz, the military theorist most likely to have been studied by U.S. officers, is viewed by the Soviets as limited by bourgeois bias. This means that an understanding of Marxist-Leninist ideology is essential to understanding the Soviet world view and their policies and strategies.

This book is somewhat repetitive, which serves to highlight the important portions. It is also relatively easy to read, compared to other Soviet writings. I recommend it as much for what it tells us about the Soviets, as for what it can teach us

about military affairs in general. Frunze was a Communist, but he was also a learned military thinker.

HISTORY TEACHINGS VIGILANCE

by

N. V. Ogarkov

Reviewed by: STEPHEN P. BLACK

Written in 1985. History Teaches Vigilance marked the return of Marshal Nikolav Ogarkov following his dismissal, in 1984, from his position as First Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. This work followed his 1982 effort entitled Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland in which Ogarkov categorically denied that there was any room for compromise or cooperation with the United States. "Active defense" and the ability to launch a "devastating counterattack in any situation and under any condition" were the cornerstones of his strategic thesis. This hard-line stance, however, was out of step with the political agenda of the then Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko. Chernenko desired a more "flexible" view of relations with the United States in order to resume arms limitations talks. This desire has been advanced significantly by Chernenko's successor Mikhail Gorbachev as part of his ongoing policies of perestroika and glasnost. History Teaches Vigilance then was viewed as a tempered, more flexible view on Soviet strategic thought vis-a-vis the United States.

Published by the Soviet Defense Ministry and receiving a "most commendable review," Ogarkov's book was praised on the

merits of his last two chapters, a "Conclusion" and the preceding, "War Should Be Prevented." In these chapters Ogarkov concluded that the threat of war still exists but can be "neutralized." In a reversal of his previous stance he claimed that cooperation between states of various social systems is "desirable," "necessary" and "possible." As optimistic as this sounds, these conclusions cannot escape the sheer weight of the first five chapters in which Ogarkov lays down in no uncertain terms that the main source of danger in the world today is imperialism, as personified by the "nuclear insanity of (the) imperialist hawks" in the United States and their "open aspirations...toward world domination." In this respect, Ogarkov's "tempered" stance and "meritorious" final chapters appear as an unwanted appendage to his true beliefs which dominate the book; namely, that the Soviet Union needs an "active defense" and an urgent concentration of effort to improve economic and technological support for a modern Soviet Armed Forces.

Written for "wide readership," History Teaches Vigilance is steeped in ideological conviction without getting lost in the pretentious cerebral gymnastics of Marxist-Leninist dialectics that are so painful to casual Western readers. This does not mean that Ogarkov abandons an emphasis on dialectics. On the contrary, he discusses them at length, but it is a discussion that is concise and well clarified by historical example. His chapter, "Based on Scientific Laws" for example is an in-depth

discussion of military science in which he lays down the Marxist-Leninists conclusion that military science is decidedly influenced by a nation's level of production. What follows is concise review of the three main components of Marxist-Leninist dialectic materialism: the contradiction between offensive and defensive systems; the denial of the negative and; the qualitative/quantitative aspects of combat equipment. Ogarkov's use of history to explain these theoretical concepts in concrete terms goes a long way in clarifying both the concepts themselves and the Soviet reliance on theoretical thinking.

Ogarkov's use of history, however, is not always focused and objectively analytical. Most of History Teaches Vigilance examines the broad scope of history primarily, but not exclusively, from 1917 to the present. The scope includes not only what Soviet history has taught them about defense but also how American history reinforces Marxist-Leninist thought concerning imperialism. Ogarkov's treatment of history, therefore, is not fully analytical and is certainly not detailed. Rather, it represents the leap of faith that the Marxist-Leninist, dialectic materialistic understanding of history (including Lenin's plagiarism of Clausewitz) has offered the only true reading of history. This is of little significance for Ogarkov is not a historian but a propagandist in search of policy support.

The first chapter, "The Source of War: an Exploitive Social Order," is a thin historical look at class struggle from

feudalism to the nuclear age. The conclusion drawn, not surprisingly is that the true source of conflict down through the ages has been class exploitation; an historical condition currently reflected most acutely by the imperialistic West and the United States in particular. It follows then that "war is the perpetual and inevitable companion of imperialism." In this context, Ogarkov reiterates Soviet philosophy concerning just (defense of socialism) and unjust (imperialistic) wars and points to the logical conclusion that the way to eliminate war is to eliminate imperialism (though he does not specifically state this).

All of this serves as a precursor to the themes that run throughout the book concerning U.S. policy and doctrine. Ogarkov's xenophobic, ideological and cursory reading of U.S. history "proves" that "White House" doctrine is "malicious ...adventurous" and "expansionist." Furthermore, American delays in entering both World Wars are indications that U.S. doctrine is to profit from war and then to move in and dictate to an exhausted enemy." Fortunately the "success of socialism" and the "contradictions of capitalism" have been able to check U.S. designs. But this has only been met with renewed U.S. aggression, exemplified by its various postwar strategies of massive retaliation, flexible response, deterrence and Reagan's "Direct Conflict;" of which were directed at the Soviet Union in order to circumvent their improving defensive achievements, including the nuclear parity achieved in the 1960s.

In contrast, the USSR has been the "standard bearer of peace." Brest-Litovsk and Soviet efforts in collective security from the 1920s to the present clearly indicate this. Imperialism, however, has thwarted such attempts. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 was an expedient for a Soviet government frustrated by western appeasement of Hitler and the resultant isolation of the Soviet Union. And for those who might have designs against the Soviet Union, Ogarkov points out that the Second World War "demonstrates that no force can shatter socialism or bring the USSR to its knees."

In this context Ogarkov sets down his fourth chapter, "Two Doctrines, Two Strategies," which compares U.S. and Soviet military doctrines. His treatment of U.S. doctrine is a rehash of his earlier xenophobic views, but his real expertise, and the true value of this book, lie in his elucidation on the form and content of Soviet doctrine. Ogarkov explicitly defines and lies out in their proper hierarchical structure, the concepts of Soviet military doctrine with both its socio-political and military-technical aspects), military art and military strategy. In doing so he clarifies the context and structure of Soviet military thought and provides insight into the Soviet views on the character of war and requirements for its conduct.

Soviet military doctrine, states Ogarkov, is a "Doctrine of Protection for Peace and Socialism." Soviet military art in this respect, concerns the means and forms of combat actions required to achieve this, which in turn leads to a military strategy that

is "defensive in nature." This defense requires, according to Ogarkov, an ability "to repel sudden attack and strike back with a powerful strike." It is a defense that vows to repel an aggressor under any condition or circumstance and never to "be taken by surprise." It views the character of war as expansive, covering "huge territories ... all continents and oceans" and "most countries." Limited war is rejected as "it will be practically impossible to restrain nuclear war within certain limits. Soviet counteractions to an imperialist attack are seen to be maneuvering, dynamic and extremely destructive, continuing "until complete victory over the enemy."

Though five years have passed and much significant change has occurred, Ogarkov's views on defense lie at the center of the debate in the West and the Soviet Union concerning the direction of Soviet force structures and doctrine adjustments under perestroika. The question remains whether Soviet security is best served by a truly "defensive-defense" or the more active "defensive-counterattack" posture that Ogarkov favors.

One of Ogarkov's themes, however, seems to have been fully embraced particularly by Gorbachev. This involves the contention that the Soviet economy must be improved in order to enable it to "successfully solve the most complex technological defense problems and to create any kind of weapon" which may be necessary to "defend the Homeland."

In his conclusions, Ogarkov has picked up on the CPSU Central Committee's party line that "one must fight against war

before it breaks out," and promote mutual cooperation in order to "prevent the nuclear fire (and) protect life on the planet." Such statements by a Soviet Marshal are of crucial significance. But it seems that these conclusions carry the full weight of his authority and not that of his convictions. Mutual cooperation and "defensive-defense" are questionable because history has taught him otherwise.

History Teaches Vigilance is a short work but it is rich in insights for the reader. I would recommend this book for a number of reasons. Ogarkov's treatment of history is broad and not rich in detail but it provides an outstanding overview of the Soviet interpretation of history, particularly U.S. history. On the theoretical level, Ogarkov's discussion of Soviet military doctrine, art and strategy is concise, authoritative and well written. Additionally, Ogarkov's position on "active defense" and the need for technological improvements represents one of the major "schools of thought" concerning the future of the Soviet Armed Forces. For these reasons and the fact that Ogarkov's writings carry the authority of a Marshal of the Soviet Union, this book is extremely valuable.

TACTICS

by

V. G. Reznichenko, Ed., et. al.

Reviewed by: KENNETH L. KNOTTS, JR.

The 1987 edition of Tactics is the third version of a work which was originally published in 1966. This book, one of a series called the "Officer's Library," was nominated in 1968 for the Frunze Prize, an annual award presented for "excellent military or military historical works."¹ A 1984 revision of Tactics was translated into English and published in the U.S. in 1987 by the U.S. Air Force as Volume 21 of its Soviet Military Thought Series. A second revision, published by the Soviets in 1987, was translated by the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) in June 1988. This JPRS translation will be the primary focus of my analysis, although I will also point out some of the more significant differences between the two most recent versions. In my analysis, I also used as a reference a pamphlet published by the Air Force in 1988 which contrasts the 1984 and 1987 editions.² I was unable to locate a translation of the 1966 edition.

Tactics was edited by a collective of three authors: Vasiliy G. Reznichenko, Ivan N. Vorobyev, and Nikolay F. Miroshnichenko.

¹William F. Scott, Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975): 2.

²Tactics: The Second (1987) Edition Compared With the 1984 Edition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force Directorate of Research and Soviet Studies, 1988.

According to Dr. Bill Scott, these men are all on the staff of the Frunze Military Academy.³ At least one of them, Reznichenko, is a retired General-Major. A direct statement of sponsorship by a higher-ranking, active-duty officer would probably have indicated even higher military approval of Tactics. However, the status of Reznichenko as a retired General-Major and the position of all the authors on the staff of the prestigious Frunze Academy, in my opinion, combine to reflect the relative importance of this book.

Tactics is directed toward the professional education of Soviet military officers, reserve officers and students in military educational institutions. Its publication in 100,000 copies shows that the book was intended for a fairly wide distribution. This work is not intended as an exhaustive study of all tactical problems, but instead is meant by the authors to be used in conjunction with Soviet Armed Forces field manuals, which contain the most important rules of tactical combat operations. The authors feel, however, that a more comprehensive understanding of in-depth problems is required to fully master the modern theory of tactics. With this goal in mind, they have sought to help officers "...master tactical art in the course of independent study as one of their objectives" (p. 1).

As might be surmised from its title, the book addresses almost exclusively the third level of Soviet military art, the tactical level. Tactics examines the complicated dynamics of tactical-level

³William F. Scott, Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1975): 34.

units on the modern battlefield. Following a historical background on the development of tactics--with particular emphasis placed upon the contributions of experiences in the Great Patriotic War and the implications of recent "revolutions in military affairs"--the authors describe the important relations of armaments and technology, along with the various forms of combined-arms battle. The subject of "tactics" is important enough to merit a two-page article in the Military Encyclopedia Dictionary. (On a related note, a careful word-for-word comparison of the 1983 and 1986 versions of the entry for "tactics" revealed only minor changes which do not reflect any substantive alternations in the definition of the term). The subject matter presented in Tactics covers all aspects addressed in the encyclopedia article, but in much greater detail in a markedly different format.

Although the theme of combined-arms combat is prevalent throughout every section of the book, the work concentrates almost solely on ground operations. Naval units are mentioned in some detail (some 2-3 pages) only in the context of transporting troops via sealift and in connection with the fire support of ground troops in maritime sectors. I found only three other references to naval units; these are only brief citations regarding readiness and discipline of supporting forces. The two areas of greatest emphasis in the 1987 edition are the sections on offensive and defensive battle. Two sections of somewhat lesser emphasis, but still given considerable attention, are the chapters on troop movement and disposition of troops in field. The increasingly

vital role played by the tactical-level commander in combat is also repeatedly stressed. According to the authors, the conditions of contemporary-war--especially the ever more complicated technology and the time compression dictated by faster reaction times--only intensify the pressures placed upon the junior commander and demand from him greater knowledge and initiative. Tactics contains detailed descriptions of many scenarios which will help a commander prepare for combat. In short, this book was very aptly described by Major Milton Nielson of the U.S. Air Force Academy's History Department as a "'cookbook' for the conduct of war."⁴

Of particular interest are the differences in the contents of the 1984 and 1987 editions. The 1987 edition is almost twice the length of the 1984 issue (496 pages versus 270, respectively). While the 1984 version does not ignore the role of emerging technologies, the latest edition features a greatly expanded coverage of the following topics: nuclear weapons, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), helicopters, automation of troop control, electronic warfare and NATO's Airland Battle. Three entirely new chapters--"Troop Control," "Comprehensive Support of the Engagement," and "Troop Disposition in the Field"--were added to the 1987 edition. These new sections pay particular attention to the preparation of emplacements to protect troops from PGMs and

⁴Major Milton C. Nielson, USAF, Instructor of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado. The major's book review of Tactics appeared in Air Power Journal, (Spring 1988): 80-81.

"weapons of mass destruction." Also notable is the fact that 40 pages were added to the chapter on "Defensive Battle."

The additions to the 1987 version reflect a growing Soviet concern over NATO's improved conventional munitions and an expanded interest in the role of defense in combat. The latter emphasis is likely the result of the Warsaw Pact's declaration, in May 1987, of its new "defensive doctrine." This factor, along with the strong impact of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" on military affairs since March 1985, I believe explains why the Soviets so drastically revised the 1984 edition of Tactics only three years later. However, the implications of the new doctrine clearly had not filtered down to the tactical level at the time of publication; despite a greater stress on the role of defense, the chapter devoted to that topic still focuses mainly on the defensive as a vehicle for a transition to a decisive offensive. Reflecting the continuing dispute over the roles of the offensive and defensive within the Soviet military, the authors state unequivocally that, "Offense is the principal form of battle" (p. 22).

To all but the most patient readers, this book will seem very tedious. It is, however, intended to be very comprehensive in order to encompass lessons learned in a wide variety of tactical situations, as viewed against a background of Soviet military experience. The book, although difficult to read, provides valuable insights into how the Soviet tactical commander will conduct business in future conflicts. As such, Tactics is an invaluable reference for information on Soviet tactical forces.

A working knowledge of its contents is an absolute must for anyone who wishes to understand Soviet tactical command and control.

THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CPSU

by

V. F. Khalipov

Reviewed by: THOMAS A. FRIES

The Military Policy of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) was signed to press on 5 November 1987. The author, Vyacheslev Filippoviich Khalipov, is a Doctor of Philosophical Sciences. I could find no further information on the author nor was I able to find a review of the book. The book had a publication run of 30,000 copies (not particularly large), and was "meant for officers, for the party and Komsomol activ of the Armed Forces, and for everyone interested in questions of CPSU military policy."

The book is important in that it was, at the time of its publication, the most formalized statement of CPSU military policy since the Soviet adoption of the policies of "defensive defense" (as opposed to the traditional Soviet military doctrine of "offensive defense) and "reasonable sufficiency." Coming at the end of 1987, the book is published after the 27th CPSU Party Congress of 1987 which is widely viewed as the Party Congress where General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev pressed for and received the adoption of his reform policies (both domestic and foreign) by the CPSU leadership. The book therefore reflects the dominant themes of the Party congress.

Reflecting the "new"¹ defensive doctrine, the book holds that the "highest goal of CPSU military policy is to prevent war and ensure a reliable defense of socialism achievements, the Soviet people's peaceful labor, and the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity." While the book is generally defensive in tone, there are some contradictory statements that lead one to believe that, at the time of publication, the debate over just what "defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency" mean has not been definitively settled. For instance, the book points out that the world has changed, that military force is no longer a viable method for states to resolve disputes, and that the policy of "new thinking," "reasonable sufficiency" and a requirement for economic growth has necessitated a reduction in Soviet military spending. Yet the book also notes the "growing military threat" requires that the CPSU spare no effort in equipping the Armed Forces with what is needed. The contradiction is that one does not normally reduce defense spending in the face of an increased military threat.

The book is notable in that it does reject some themes, which in the past, have been common themes of military writings. Chief among these is the rejection of "world war" as a continuation of politics by other means. Also while not explicitly rejected, there is no mention of providing support to

¹I do not intend to be sarcastic nor do I intend to convey the idea that I do not believe any Soviet pronouncements, but the Soviets have claimed that their military doctrine was defensive since Brezhnev's Tula speech of 1977.

national liberation movements.

One of the more interesting themes I found in the book was the oft repeated theme of the Party as the final arbiter of defense policy. While this is nothing new and has indeed always been accepted by the military (at least the socio-political side of military doctrine), the book goes to great length to point out that it is because of the party's leadership that the country has attained strategic parity. Also repeated on several occasions is the claim that the Party has provided and will continue to provide all that is needed for the Armed Forces to accomplish their missions. The interference here is that military grumbling about reduced defense spending as possibly indicative of the Party's commitment to the defense of the motherland is unwarranted.

Some western analysts have pointed out that perestroika is intended to benefit Soviet military industry as well as the civilian economy. The Military Policy of the CPSU makes no secret of the matter pointing out that "the accomplishments of such essential management tasks will contribute...also to an improvement in the defense industry proper. The theme of the need to improve the national economy is often repeated.

Overall, the book is worth reading because, for its time, it is noticeably free of the polemics about the threat from the west and it does make some statements that, prior to this, had not been seen on this subject. But still, the overall impression I got from this book is that the debate (as of late 1987) is not

over yet. As I mentioned earlier, while it is generally defensive in tone one could pick out bits of information to support both sides of the argument over whether Soviet military policy has indeed changed. (The author of the review personally feels it has as a result of several factors.) With the 28th Party Congress scheduled for this summer, another book on this subject should be published soon afterwards. Perhaps the author will be more authoritative (my assumption is Khalipov is not) and the evidence supporting a change in military doctrine will be more readily ascertainable.

PART II

SPECIALIZED MILITARY SUBJECTS

MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY

by

V.V. Shelyag, Ed., et. al.

Reviewed by: DEENA R. SOSTROM

This book went to the presses in 1972 as part of the Soldier's Bookshelf series. 150,000 copies were printed. This work is not to be confused with a book of the same name published in 1967. The stated audiences for this work are officer candidates and students of higher Military-political schools.

Military psychology is a specialized branch of psychology that "studies the patterns in the mental activities of people and collectives under the conditions of military activities (service, combat, political-moral and psychological preparation for combat) and combat."¹ The authors seem to feel that this work is a "how-to" book:

Military psychology must provide sound and specific recommendations on elaborating the effective ways, means, and methods for educating personnel. It must provide recommendations on seeking out ways for reducing the time required to bring troops to a state of high combat readiness, as well as for further improving and perfecting the style of work of military personnel, and the scientific organization of military labor.²

¹V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotchkin, and K.K. Platonov, Ed., Military Psychology (Moscow, 1972, translated USAF Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), p. 15.

²Ibid., p.3.

The amount of how to type information is limited and general in nature. They also stated that they have relied on research data in this field. If this is so the research is not presented or seemingly footnoted. What is presented is a primer in Soviet psychology and its relationship to military psychology. As a primer it is a very good text. Each chapter opens by defining the concepts covered and then proceeds to give the importance of these concepts to psychology and military psychology in particular.

A major theme is the centrality of dialectical materialism. Without this basis psychology can not be scientific or do more than hint at the truth. It is stated that to not have this as its basis will allow psychology to be vulgarized and used as a weapon by the imperialist against the USSR and to prop up their own decaying structures.³

Another theme is the importance of military psychology: The USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.A. Grechko, had stressed: "In order to correctly organize the process of training and education, officers should not only be well trained in a political and military-technical sense, but also possess completely concrete and firm knowledge in the area of pedagogics and psychology."⁴

In carrying out the designated tasks, military psychology makes it possible for the commander or political worker to

³Ibid., p. 56.

⁴Ibid., p. 3.

effectively control the men and collectives, and to form military teamwork, solidarity, discipline, and other features which characterize a military collective.⁵

A third theme is that with proper military training which includes the use of military psychology that soldiers can be trained and prepared for all forms of war.⁶ This includes nuclear war:

It can be expected that the modern battlefield will be saturated by terrifying phenomena which are unexpected for the men. These include: nuclear explosions, light radiation, the radioactive contamination of the terrain, and fires from napalm weapons. In order that the tension and danger of modern combat not cause a panic and other negative responses, even in peacetime the soldier should be prepared for accepting a nuclear missile war and combat, as well as for correct actions in this situation... comprise an urgent military psychological problem deriving from the theses of Soviet military science.⁷

A theme that reoccurred throughout was the role of the collective and the need to develop the collectives psychology. One instance showing the importance of the collective was illustrated "During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our soldiers often stopped attempts of panicking troops to leave the battlefield.

⁵Ibid., p. 20.

⁶Ibid., p. 26.

⁷Ibid., p. 66.

Fear and manifestation of cowardice in one soldier are overcome by the high fighting spirit of the entire collective.⁸

The role of labor was repeatedly brought out. Labor was stressed as necessary for the evolution of mankind from animal "In his classic work 'The role of Labor in the Transition of Ape to Man,' R. Engles showed that labor is 'the first basic condition of human life, and to such a degree that, in a certain sense, we should say: labor created man himself.'"⁹

As a psychology text, on the whole, it is not bad but is more detailed than most people would appreciate. The theories are interesting especially in that they do come from a non standard theoretical base for Americans and it might be interesting to see how much can be corroborated using western scientific methods. As for a general military reader the chapters in part one, particularly chapter 3, and those dealing with combat and military units (chapter 12.3, chapters 25-29) would be the most interesting and salient. I was never able to determine how much of the distortion in the Soviet view of bourgeois psychology (chapter 3) was because they were attempting to force a Soviet style framework on a western (predominantly US) style work, how much was due to the difference in theory, and how much was purposeful distortion for propaganda. This book is a context builder for Soviet soldiers and can be a context builder for students of the Soviets.

⁸Ibid., p. 363.

⁹Ibid., p. 87.

Forecasting In Military Affairs
A Soviet View

by

Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov

Reviewed by: KENNETH J. JOHNS

Chuyev's 1975 work, Forecasting in Military Affairs, is both troubling and encouraging. Troubling, because it highlights some of our own deficiencies, and encouraging, because it validates what we think we do right.

The book was published in the U.S. as the 16th volume in the "Soviet Military Thought" series, under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force. The Soviet edition, which consisted of 12,000 copies, was published by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense, for members of the military, industry, and related academic fields.

Chuyev, who is an accomplished academic, and author of several important works in related fields, ¹ undertakes two primary tasks in writing the present volume. First, he attempts to outline the general principles of forecasting, or predictive systems, describing their constituent components, their various

¹For example, Krylatyye rakety [Cruise Missiles], Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964; Isseledovaniye operatsiy v voyennom dele [Operations Research in Military Affairs], Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970; and Prognozirovaniye kolichestvennykh kharakteristik protsessov [Forecasting Quantitative Characteristics of Processes], Moscow: "Sov. Radio," 1975.

types, and the functions that they perform in solving various military problems. Secondly, he examines the three basic classes of forecasting systems--heuristic, mathematical, and composite--and outlines what he views as the relative strengths and shortcomings of each type with respect to specific areas of military problem-solving and decision-making. After a lengthy and somewhat tedious analysis, Chuyev arrives at the conclusion that in most military situations, the decision-maker's requirements are best fulfilled by employing a system which combines both heuristic (relying on expert opinion) and mathematical forecasting.

A third, yet unstated aim of Chuyev's is to demonstrate the increasing importance of military forecasting in the world of highly sophisticated weaponry, and a rapidly changing battlefield. He addresses himself here to his colleagues in the Ministry of Defense, and his patrons in the Politburo. By citing no less than a dozen times that military forecasting is an "independent branch of military-scientific research," Chuyev appears to petition for an augmented role and additional rubles for his branch. With ground forces preeminent in the Soviet military, and with emphasis on ICBMs, it's likely that Chuyev and his breed fought heated budget battles to justify expenditures on such mundane things as automated control systems and computers.

To the U.S. military reader, the benefits of this work are reaped long before Chuyev reaches his rather unrevealing conclusion. It is by understanding how Soviet military

commanders and political leaders view the decision-making process, and how they see the basic nature of the variables in that process," and how they see the basic nature of the variables in that process, that we as potential adversaries, can learn from this book. Chuyev provides important, though unintended insights in this respect.

First, scientific forecasting, in the military or any other field, is firmly rooted in the teachings of Marx and Lenin. According to the principles of dialectical and historical materialism, and the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, all things are knowable. "Not only is knowledge of the past and present possible, but knowledge of the past and present possible, but knowledge of the future as well, since in principle there are no unknowable things,... but only things... that are not yet comprehended."² Additionally, the presence of "objective regularities" in nature and society, render the Soviets confident that they can anticipate the enemy's actions, develop appropriate weapons and countermeasures, and predict the course and outcome of military conflicts.³

This degree of certainty and confidence should not be taken as mere dogma, but as a basic component of a genuine world view, on which Soviet decision-makers can be expected to act. Thus, to

²Chuyev and Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military Affairs, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975) USAF Soviet Military Thought, No. 16, p. 22.

³ibid., p. 23.

a Marxist-Leninist-trained military commander or leader, everything is quantifiable, measurable, and predictable. Attacks will be initiated when the mathematically correct correlation of forces is achieved and not before; the scientifically proven combat effectiveness of one combination of weapons and tactics will determine its employment over another; the intentions and behavior of the enemy can be graphically plotted, and correct countermeasures timely employed. The U.S. commander would do well to familiarize himself with his opponents method of decision-making, and avoid the costly mistakes which are inevitable in mirror-imaging.

A second major insight which is revealed in Chuyev's work, is concerned with Soviet perceptions of our methods of forecasting and decision-making. Chuyev readily admits that a major impetus for his book was the near complete lack of Soviet writings on the subject of forecasting systems. He quotes liberally from Western sources, attributing to them a degree of authoritativeness which is at once satisfying and disarming. Thus, for example, he praises the ground-breaking work done at Rand Corporation in the 1950s and 60s on systems analysis and heuristic forecasting methods, and the work of Charles Hitch in the Defense budgeting process.⁴

⁴Chuyev cites the "Delphi" projects conducted by RAND in 1963-64, designed around mathematical manipulation of experts' responses to successive "rounds" of questionnaires on a range of topics; also, Charles Hitch, Decision-making for Defense, (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1965).

How should we interpret this book? It is a highly technical work, requiring a solid footing in mathematics, statistics, and operations research for full comprehension. However, even without such a background, a great deal can be apprehended. On the one hand, even with no knowledge of transcendental equations or the many methods of mathematical modeling (of which Chuyev makes great use), we can appreciate the way Soviet decision-makers will think, and the way they treat the many uncertainties in the "fog of war." In short, they feel that there are no uncertainties, and their approach to conflicts will reflect that belief. There is nothing that can't be quantified, measured, categorized and mastered. In this, there is something we might learn. They have methods for calculating the correlation of forces and combat effectiveness. Though their methods might seem excessively rigid and mechanistic to us, they nonetheless have a method and they use it. And we, regrettably, do not.

On the other hand, Chuyev's work provides a modicum of encouragement. The fact that a well-respected scholar and scientist recognizes the considerable advantages we enjoy in employing systems analysis, heuristics, and subjective factors in military forecasting, should tell us that we are at least doing something right. Even more encouraging, however, is the fact that the Soviets may have developed an approach to the subject of military forecasting that is consonant with the U.S. approach. In this way, the two superpowers might diminish the chance of widely divergent forecasts, which are a major factor in causing

unintended conflicts.

Chuyev's work, then, provides commentary not only on the Soviet's way of doing things, but on our own, as well. With luck, perhaps we can both learn from the other.

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE THEORY OF TROOP CONTROL

by

P. K. Altukhov, et. al

Reviewed by: DOUGLAS E. WALKER

Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control is a manual intended to provide a general familiarization of command and control fundamentals for officers of all ranks, but is aimed primarily at mid-to-senior-level officers, with generally ten and more years of service and/or a military staff background. The manual addresses few specifics beyond providing examples to underscore a general element of planning or control. 18,000 copies were printed, commensurate with the annotated statement that the manual is intended for officers of the Armed Forces. Within the hierarchy of Soviet military thought, this work addresses troop control at and below the level of strategic operations, down to approximately the cast or regimental staff level. Throughout the book the terms 'operation' and 'battle' were used interchangeably or simultaneously, and the principles discussed were applicable at the aforementioned levels. The importance of the book and acceptance of the principles contained therein is indicated by its having been reviewed for use as a text for officers attending Soviet military academies.

Developing a theory of troop control became a subject which appeared in the Soviet general staff journal Voyennaya Mysl'

(Military Thought) in the October 1965 (no. 10) issue, and with increasing regularity afterwards. In that issue Col P. Shemanskiy voiced the question of the need to develop a theory of troop control. Following his article, in the February 1966 (no. 2) issue, three colonels and a major argued the need for the development of a scientific theory troop control to replace the terse explanation contained in a 1965 military encyclopedia. The discussion of developing a theory of troop control continued in later issues of the journal, centered primarily upon what specifics should be included in that development. A major article during the discussion, published in June 1970, was written by Major General A. Tatarchenko, one of the authors of the final version, and much of his article can be found in the final product.

Fundamentals of Control begins with a discussion of the theory of troop control by establishing its importance for obtaining maximum combat potential from available forces. It predictably supports its principles by citing "correct" scientific and dialectic interpretation of history, including Marxist-Leninist dogma presented in surrogate historical lessons cited from the Great Patriotic War, during which commanders exercising effective troop control in conformity with Leninist principles of leadership achieved brilliant victories which offset the ineffectiveness of countries fighting in the West, and enabled Russia to win the war. The Leninist work style is extolled as being creative and highly scientific, without self-

will or triteness, and is characterized by being efficient, businesslike, and having round-the-clock conviction made possible by communist moral fiber.

This manual presents principles of Soviet troop control in the context of challenges to that control expected to be encountered on the battlefield. Three distinct themes are apparent in Soviet concerns for control and planning. First, the need for scientifically sound planning. Subsets to the sound planning theme are the need for the commander to; ensure the time allowed for units to achieve their goals is neither more nor less than the time allotted; provide flexibility to allow for weapons of mass destruction; plan for coordination between all units, including naval units if operating near a coast; use heuristic and mathematical models to forecast possible outcomes of an operation as a whole and as individual tasks; and finally, that the commander has personal responsibility to the CPSU for the success or failure of his plan.

The second theme is the need to monitor the execution of the plan. Subsets to the monitoring theme include the need to maintain close contact with all command levels, the critical nature of timely and accurate flow of information, the need to keep all secondary or mobile command posts informed of the progress of the operation (battle) at all time in order to ensure a smooth and timely switch from one command post to another can be achieved as conditions demand, and that the commander has personal responsibility to the CPSU for the effectiveness of his

monitoring of the operation (battle). The book works at cross purposes in this theme--in one it supports allowing creativity and flexibility among subordinates, but in another underscores the importance of planning so thorough that no detail, however small, is unaccounted for. the recurrent theme of the commander's personal responsibility to the CPSU is, quite obviously, the solution to the apparent disparity between the two ideas.

The third theme is the need for stability and continuity of control during conditions under which operations (battles) are expected to take place. One subset of this theme directly addresses conditions and threats expected to be encountered during an operation (battle). These include, but are not limited to, electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance/sabotage, airborne assault, airmobile force attack, weapons of mass destruction, and lasers and other unspecified technologically advanced weapons. Another subset addresses principles through which the requisite stability and continuity is achieved--secrecy, defense and dispersal of alternate (to replace a main) and auxiliary (to control forces dispersed from the main axis) control points. Emphasis was placed upon the need for dispersed alternate and auxiliary control points to provide a counter to the psychological environment of a nuclear war, as well as provide a system for ensuring continuation of the operation (battle) in the event of a failure of communications. In this regard, the work stresses the importance of keeping all subordinate command points

apprised of the progress of the operation (battle), as well as the commander's intentions. Movement of command points in correct with troop advances is also indicated as a critical element of maintaining stability and continuity. the incorporation of automated troop control systems is advocated, with the caution that the systems must be evaluated for their value in accuracy and support requirements, to avert adverse impact on control continuity. The text notes that automated control systems may create excessive support demands, which cannot be easily met under battle conditions, and that in evaluating the usefulness of such systems key issues to consider are; accuracy, speed, security, expansion capacity, compatibility, reliability, survivability, and serviceability. The text devoted special attention to was the need to successfully transition from peacetime training to wartime effort with maximum speed, smoothness and continuity. As always, the commander is personally responsible to the CPSU for the stability and continuity of control during an operation (battle).

Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control is a work which should be read by any officer anticipating the possibility of leading or directing combat forces against Soviet units. It contains principles of control and communication which should be acknowledged and anticipated prior to engaging Soviet forces in the field, as well as revealing what the Soviets envision as the conditions most likely to effect the conduct of operations (battle) in the near future. It should also be read by anyone

seeking to gain insight into the battlefield the Soviets expect to conduct operations on. By discussing what principles are important, and what to expect in planning operations of battles, Control reveals the command and control areas considered important by the Soviets, and what threats they expect to effect their C2 capabilities in the field. Additionally, the book provides noteworthy ideas which may be of value to officers of Western battle staffs open to ideas of merit, wherever found. Finally, the book provides fundamental principles of troop control to which Soviet staffs are expected to adhere, and therefore would be of interest to any reader studying Soviet troop control, staff organization, or lines of command and responsibility.

CIVIL DEFENSE

by

P.T. Yegorov, et. al.

Reviewed by: STEVEN A. WHITE

Civil Defense is a 1970 handbook written by the Soviet instructors for use by engineering and liberal arts students. Their goal was to explain civil defense measures and proper methods of protection, and thus help students to be effective formation leaders in any war involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.

A bend of easy reading, technical information, and political propaganda, Civil Defense reflects little serious effort to create a tight, smoothly flowing work. Discussions overlap, and each author pays individual homage to the Party and Lenin. Further, there is no conclusion to tie the chapters together and no reference citations. The result is mosaic -- as though off-the-shelf pamphlets and literature were thrown together in response to higher tasking. Nonetheless, the book provides a valuable survey of the entire Soviet civil defense program in a single volume, and encompasses both theoretical and practical aspects.

The book promotes three primary themes. The first is that this program is necessary only because of aggressive behavior by the West. The authors maintain the Soviets have made every effort to ensure world peace, but a Western-inspired arms race threatens

to unleash thermonuclear war. They contend imperialist doctrine emphasizes surprise and relies on nuclear weapons, so the USSR may be subjected to nuclear strikes with little warning during the initial phase of a war. Consequently, the government and Party were forced to create a program for "protecting the population, creating necessary conditions for maintaining operational stability of the national economy in wartime, and, if the enemy uses weapons of mass destruction, performing rescue and urgent emergency-restoration work."¹ The program was subordinated to the Ministry of Defense and closely integrated with military defense.² In addition to explaining the rationale, mission and goals of civil defense, the authors outline organizational concepts, responsibilities, and training programs. They also discuss the Party's role, though in considerably less detail than other topics.

The authors' second theme is that workers are the country's most valuable asset; if they can be saved, everything else can be restored.³ Therefore, protecting the population is crucial and can be accompanied only by long-term, intense efforts on a mass scale. Compulsory training, education, and advance planning are

¹P.T. Yegorov et. al., Civil Defense, xvii. This definition of goals agrees with that contained in the 1970 Great Soviet Encyclopedia (translated 1975).

²Civil defense was given a boost by Brezhnev in 1972, when its head was granted co-equal status with military service chiefs and given the title Deputy Minister of Defense. See: David Rees, Soviet Preparedness (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984) 23.

³P.T. Yegorov et. al., Civil Defense, 71.

essential. To this end, the authors devote significant attention to the characteristics and detection techniques for chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. They explain the warning, evacuation and dispersion process and provide detailed plans for constructing blast and fallout shelters.⁴ They also furnish practical information on official and improvised personal protective devices. Perhaps the weakest point of the book, though, is its discussion of nourishment. While it tediously addresses such details as exact settings for DP-3 roentgenometers, appropriate colors for fallout shelter heating pipes, and actions to be taken if in a movie theater when a warning sounds, the book provides scant specifics on food and drink.

Yegorov comments that "to wreck the enemy's economy has always been the purpose of war."⁵ From this blunt assessment flows the third major theme: national economic installations must be given all possible protection. This is especially important in modern warfare because nuclear weapons blur the distinction between front and rear, and can destroy a city with single strike. Therefore, the authors contend, all urban and industrial planning must be undertaken with civil defense in mind. Factories should be designed to safeguard workers and ensure the survival of expensive or unique equipment. Civil Defense explains how each industrial

⁴On pages 74-75, Shlyakhov notes that if left unprotected, 90 percent of a city's population would die. By conducting a thorough dispersal, losses would amount to only "several" percent.

⁵Ibid., 163.

plant must make plans and take actions to ensure it can continue independent production until normal conditions return. That means maintaining resource reserves and being prepared conduct post-attack reconnaissance, rescue and restoration activities.

When analyzing this book, one must remember its context. Published in 1970, Civil Defense was presumably one of higher education's answers to the 23rd Party Congress' call to improve civil defense training nation-wide. It reflects the 1960s Soviet image of future war -- inevitable nuclear conflict between imperialist and socialist states, targeting major cities and industrial centers, and involving a wide geographical area. At the time, the U.S. was pressing for acceptance of the mutually assured destruction (MAD) concept, because it lacked any meaningful active defense against nuclear attack. The Kremlin, preferring a strategy of deterrence based on denial rather than punishment, rejected MAD.⁶ By demonstrating its determination to prepare for and survive nuclear war, the USSR hoped to convince imperialists they could not achieve their war objectives. Thus, civil defense was regarded as an integral part of the military strategy defined by Sokolovsky, and recognized as influencing three of the four potentials (economic, moral/political, military, and scientific) which affect the outcome of war.

⁶Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Trends in Soviet Military Policy," in Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe, ed. H.J. Ellison (Seattle: University of Washington, Press, 1983): 215.

It is also useful to consider the context of 1982, when the U.S. Government Printing Office released this translated version of Civil Defense. At the time, there was increasing concern in the West over Soviet intentions. During the 1970s, the USSR had deployed new offensive strategic weapon systems, engaged in a buildup of naval/conventional forces, increased its "combat readiness," and given another boost to its civil defense program.⁷ Unaware that Soviet doctrine had shifted in favor of a quick conventional war, conservatives pointed to literature such as this book to prove the Kremlin was preparing to wage nuclear war. Liberals countered that, because the U.S. had a declaratory policy of targeting economic and industrial centers, the Soviet program was a logical reaction. This led to a reemergence of the old American debate over the rationality of nuclear war and the effectiveness and role of civil defense.⁸

In its essence, then, this handbook represents theoretical and practical measures for implementing the 1970s Soviet belief that future wars, although inevitably nuclear, can be survived by advance planning and mass mobilization. The Soviet leadership now agrees that nuclear war is suicidal. The fact that civil defense continues to be officially integrated into Soviet military strategy

⁷David Rees notes the Soviets also attempted to deny the existence of its civil defense effort, even changing the name of the Moscow Military School of Civil Defense to Higher Command School of Road and Engineer Troops.

⁸Robert Scheer criticizes the Reagan administration for promoting nuclear war as winnable in his book With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush & Nuclear War.

probably should not unduly concern Westerners, for several reasons. First, civil defense is still valid for conventional wars, and so will not be abandoned lightly. Second, like any bureaucracy, the Soviet apparatus resists change. Finally, one might actually anticipate increasing emphasis on civil defense as the Soviet military transitions toward "defensive sufficiency." Nonetheless, because the function remains subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, any discussions of civil defense capabilities and strategies will continue to be of interest to those (e.g., nuclear strategists and planners, arms control negotiators) who monitor Soviet military planning.

ECONOMIC CONFLICT IN WARFARE

by

S.A. Bartenev

Reviewed by: MICHAEL L. DONNER, SR.

The book Economic Conflict in Warfare in the author's words: "... discusses matters of economic conflict in light of the growing military threat, which is the fault of (American) imperialism." This ostensible view, however, belies the main purpose of the book, which seems to be a warning to the socialist "brotherhood of nations" that they have in large degree lost the economic might to compete successfully in war with their western adversaries; and that new factors which can swing the correlation of forces back to a favorable condition for the Soviet Union by offsetting these economic disadvantages must be found if the USSR is to prevail in war. The author, a Doctor of Economic Sciences, seems to be attempting to make this clear as the Soviet Union enters a period of even steeper economic decline.

The book has three main themes. The first theme developed by the author seems to be to integrate fully the economic sphere of the war on a co-equal basis with the other factors that comprise the spectrum of warfare: political factors, ideological factors, and armed conflict. He writes: "We know that war is not limited to armed struggle. It also involves other forms of struggle-economic, political, and ideological ... the

significance of economic factors lies not just in the fact that they provide the material and technical foundation of a war. Economic means are also a weapon and the object of armed struggle ...". Lest he tread on any influential military toes, the author is quick to point out the importance of the armed struggle in war: "Warfare consists mainly of armed struggle ... Economic struggle furthers and is subordinate to the armed struggle;" yet the author points out that, as with the economic sphere, the armed struggle sphere is likewise subordinated to the political and policy goals of the Communist Party, and, thus, he concludes: "All of this shows that the results of war are not achieved by purely military means alone, that war is a military and an economic ... conflict between the sides."

Having stated his broad philosophical assertion that the economic sphere is important in warfare, the author then proceeds to specifics in how the economic sphere can influence the outcome of war. In doing this, he speaks of a concept well-known to Soviet military theorists; i.e., the "stability of the rear" dictum deemed by Stalin to be of the utmost importance to the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The author, while not using the Stalinist term, is clearly speaking of this stability when he writes: "The theory that under wartime conditions all (economic) sectors are engaged exclusively in satisfying (the military effort), leaving no resources for meeting civilian needs ... needs no refutation because it is contrary to common sense." In other words, one of the major missions of the economic potential

of the Soviet Union in a war will be to provide for the basic subsistence of the Soviet people, thus stabilizing the rear area and freeing the army to fight the enemy. The author also asserts that this economic rear, given its high importance, must be protected; he sees it to be extremely vulnerable: "The increased vulnerability of the economic rear is due not only to the appearance of new and extremely destructive weapons,... (but also) chemical weapons, ... toxic chemicals, napalm, and new types of ammunition." Interestingly, along these same lines of "rear stability," the author lists nuclear strikes against economic targets and aerial bombing of industrial centers as plausible economic strategies; this seems to be an indication that the Soviets continue to see a counterforce mission for strategic weapons directed against economic targets.(1)

Having developed the importance of the economic sphere in war, the author introduces and defines another term: military-economic potential. It must be remembered that this book was written in 1986, two years into the process of glasnost; therefore, the economic shortcomings of the Communist system were beginning to become apparent. In the definition of this new concept, the author seems to be indicating that the total economic output of nation is not the determining factor in the economic sphere in war. "Military-economic potential is designated for meeting military needs. It embraces not all but only a certain portion of economic resources-financial, production, and human Military-economic potential (is) the

maximum portion of the economic potential which can be used for military purposes." Thus, the author seems to be asserting that the aggregate economic indicators that put the West in such a superior economic position vis-a-vis the socialist bloc do not necessarily mean that the Soviet Union will be economically dominated in a future war; by devoting a larger percentage of its economic product to the military sphere the Soviet Union can maintain military-economic parity with the West, if not by classic economic indicators, then by its military-economic potential. Ironically, this percentage of GNP devoted to the military is one of the major indices that the United States uses to determine the sincerity of the Soviet Union's stated desire to lessen tension in the world. Therefore, a potential for misunderstanding exists; whereas the United States sees an increase in the percentage of GNP devoted to the military as a belligerent action, the Soviet Union could very well, under this theory military-economic potential, view it as their only option in offsetting the tremendous-economic advantage of the western alliance.

Another mechanism by which the economic sphere of war can be brought to bear by an adversary is the use of "economic blackmail" in a period absent any overt armed conflict between two belligerents; judging by the rhetoric which is used to denounce this type of action, it is clear that the author sees in this type of economic pressure a great danger for the socialist countries of the world: "Imperialism is attempting to find

acceptable means of aggression . . . economic warfare is one of those means. Experience has shown that the U.S. is attempting to make extensive use of the weapon of economic blackmail." Interestingly, in the face of the massive defense buildup of both the superpowers in the 1980s, the author sees an economic as well as military motive on the part of the U.S.: "One of the features ... of interdependence of the military-economic rivalry." Again, in another section of the book, the author states:" ...the economic weapon is an extremely flexible and convenient form of action against the enemy." Obviously, he thinks the mechanism of economic pressure (through, for example, trade embargoes and economic sanctions) is both efficient and effective. Even though the Soviet Union was really in no position to exert any type of economic pressure on anyone in 1986, the author does go to great lengths to point out all the strategic minerals which the U.S. lacks and needs to import. The implication here is clear; the Soviet Union, occupying a mineral-rich continent, can perhaps through this mechanism exert some economic pressure on the West.

To conclude the first major theme of the book: the author works very hard to carve out a niche for the economic sphere of warfare, if not a niche co-equal to armed conflict, then one that still can play a determining role in the outcome of a war. It can do this by affecting the stability of the rear areas of the army and, prior to the armed conflict even starting, by influencing world events by imposing economic pressure on a potential adversary. Furthermore, the USSR should remain undaunted by the

supposed economic superiority of the West in that, by devoting a larger share of national economic output to the military sector, it can keep its military-economic potential on par with its adversaries.

The second major theme of the book is the concept of the "correlation of military-economic potentials." Again, in this theme, the author tries to lessen the importance of the fact that the West has achieved economic superiority over the Soviet Union: "In the comparison of military-economic potentials, a great deal of attention is given to ...calculating their basic components ... It should be borne in mind that the correlation of military-economic potential depends on many circumstances, the nature of the conflict, its scope and duration ..." In this passage, the author seems to be saying that the Soviet Union's disadvantage economically vis-a-vis the West can be offset by the "scope and duration" of the conflict; i.e., the USSR can hope to win only a somewhat limited conflict of short duration. The author returns three more times to this same point: "The assessment of the balance of power cannot be based merely on mathematical calculations of the possibilities of the states, on a simple summation of the magnitude of the individual factors." Again: "...it (is) necessary to fully consider the aggregate of the factors ... out of which are formed the actual capabilities and forces of the sides." Finally: "The Leninist methodology for analyzing the correlation of forces. . . shows that even if the imperialist enemy has superiority in material resources ...

factors which compensate for and equalize that superiority can and must be found." Thus, it is an obviously important theme to the author; the Soviet Union, regardless of the concept of military-economic potential developed in the first theme, is lagging the West in economic development. Given that military-economic potential is an important factor in the outcome of a war, the Soviet Union must, if it wishes to avoid defeat by the West in war, must find a factor to offset its economic inferiority.

The third major theme of the author deals with what he calls "technological warfare." It is obviously another area of great concern to this author. he states: "The main attention (of the United States) is . . . devoted . . . to the development of qualitatively new systems." Not surprisingly, the Strategic Defense Initiative leads off his list of examples in this area. Concurrent with this policy, the U.S. has expanded a program aimed at denying technological exports to socialist countries, with the "...ultimate goal (of isolating) the socialist nations from modern technology, to retard their economic development and destroy the strategic military parity." Again, recognizing the inability of the Soviet Union to produce its own technology (but, of course, not saying so), the author seems extremely fearful the his country will be left behind by the technological revolution. All he can do, however, is take solace in the dialectical processes of history in which he so fervently believes: "The Laws of social development can neither be ignored

nor witted, no matter how hard the ruling circles of the imperialist powers try to do so. The course of history is inexorable, and no kind of technological refinement can place obstacles in its path ... The imperialists' hopes of frustrating ... economic, scientific, and technological progress in the socialist commonwealth are clearly baseless and futile." Interestingly, in only a very few instances does he claim the socialist countries have the capability of keeping up with the West on technological grounds.

In conclusion, the book stripped of its Marxist-Leninist diatribes and Soviet version of historical analysis, paints a very gloomy picture of the economic potential of the Soviet Union to fight a war with the western alliance. Author draws somewhat startling conclusions, such as the one that the USSR must find other favorable correlations of forces to offset its economic inferiority, one of which might be the "scope and duration" of the next conflict. In the area of the "technology war," it is clear to the author that the technological potential of the West is vastly superior to that of the socialist bloc; this is evident by his claim that only through the "laws of social development" will the West be unable to subdue the Soviet Union with its technology. The author clearly feels that, in order to fight and win the next war, the Soviets must come up with a factor which can offset their economic impotence and their technological backwardness. It seems reasonably certain that a book utilizing this tone could only come from the era of glasnost, when the true

picture of the economic dilemma in which the Soviet Union found itself came clearly to light. One thing is for certain, the military-economic potential of the Soviet Union as it stands today would not be sufficient to fight and win a protracted war with the west. Thus, perhaps the more likely scenario involving a possible conflict with the Soviet Union in the near future will (as unlikely as that overall situation seems to be right now in this time of decreasing tensions) involves a short timeframe scenario, where the West does not get the chance to utilize its vast economic advantage. It is obvious that, for the Soviet Union, anything else would be unfeasible.

ENDNOTE

1. This recognition of economic targets as subject to nuclear strikes by the U.S. is interesting because, from the beginning of the Reagan administration, many U.S. nuclear theorists had questioned the effectiveness of such targeting. For example, Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, writing in "Foreign Policy" in the summer of 1980, said: "In the late 1970s, the United States targeted a range of Soviet economic entities that were important either to war-supporting industry or to economic recovery. The rationale for this targeting scheme was, and remains, fragile. War-supporting industry is important only for a war of considerable duration or a period of postwar defense mobilization. Moreover, although recovery from war is an

integral part of the Soviet theory of victory, it is less important than the achievement of military success ...thus the current trend_is to move away from targeting the... economy."

(Source: Bobbitt, Philip, et al., U.S. Nuclear Strategy, A Reader, New York University Press, Washington Square, NY, 1989, p. 473). Thus, it appears that even though the U.S. declaratory policy seemed to be moving away from nuclear attacks on economic targets, the Soviets still see this type of attack as a viable threat.

PROTECTION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC FACILITIES
FROM WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A HANDBOOK

by

G.P. Demidenko

Reviewed by: DIEGO R. CORRAL

Protection of National Economic Facilities From Weapons of Mass Destruction was translated into English and published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service as a JPRS Report, 08 August 1988.

The book is a ready reference source. Its information helps in the analysis of the effects of modern weaponry on the infrastructure of a nation. It also shows ways to minimize the potential damage to the socio-political-economic system of a country that the use of weapons of mass destruction would cause.

Demidenko believes that the Western World is on the way to achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union through the utilization of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict. He notes that the United States is preparing to take the arms race into space. This aggressive nature, he notes, is the opposite of the policy of the USSR, which proposes a realistic plan to terminate the nuclear global threat and annihilate all weapons of mass destruction to provide a safer world. Demidenko's analysis of the status of the current political world and its instability shows the need for the Soviet Union to respond against this external threat by increasing its defensive strength and preparing its armed forces to repel any foreign aggression.

The author considers that future war will involve weapons of mass destruction. These weapons, with their capability to inflict enormous destructive power and great injury, will turn the front and rear lines into one battleground. Cities and rural areas alike will be affected by the horrendous power of these weapons.

The human losses and the material damages would be so enormous that the ability of a nation to survive would be proportional to the amount of preparations taken during peacetime to ensure proper protection of the population against weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the national economic apparatus in wartime.

The main objective of this book is to help the Soviet Union prepare for an eventful attack by weapons of mass destruction. It seeks to make clear the effects of these weapons upon the Soviet society and the means to nullify the effects through proper command control and physical infrastructure readiness. One could easily say that this publication contains valuable information for establishments that deal with civil defense matters (the intended audience), but also for a wide spectrum of users.

The book is clearly divided into two parts. In the first part the author provides a description of the combat features and the principles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and conventional weapons. This part is an excellent introductory course in weapons of mass destruction. After digesting all the presented literature one could understand the intricacies of nuclear weapons from the manufacture to the effects of its detonation; the inhumane nature

of chemical weapons, their production, application, conceptualization and destruction of humans and nature; the bacteriological agents that produce large-scale injuries to people, animals and crops through biological weapons; and the conventional weapons with all of their types and applications. In this section of the book it is interesting to note that the author cites only the America's nuclear delivery platform, its chemical-bacteriological arsenal and the delivery ways that the United States will use them and the areas that it will target. It makes no reference to the USSR weapons arsenal or its employment policy.

The second part of the book addresses the destructive effects that these weapons have upon buildings, installations, and people. In this section the user is presented with several scenarios and problem solving techniques to assess the capabilities of: the different manufacturing production complexes with their material and technical supply systems; the supporting services; and the organizational workforce available to withstand the destructive effects of nuclear explosions and to design methods and measures to increase their survivability and enhance their stability.

Demidenko does an excellent job addressing the effects that wartime has on the functioning of industrial complexes. He points out the necessity for stability of the nation's economic facilities, and shows the means to measure readiness to react when affected by a nuclear explosion.

The last portion of the book contains useful charts of data to be utilized for calculating the parameters mentioned before.

It's interesting to realize that the book is directed toward the possible destruction of the economical structure of the Soviet Union due to a possible nuclear attack.

I fault the writer for not taking into consideration that catastrophic damages could also result from disturbances of nature due to human technical error, such as the Chernobyl incident. I believe the reference book could have gained enormously if the author had dedicated a chapter to the Chernobyl disaster, the lessons learned, and practical data gathered from such incidents. The book is written in a technical form, and sometimes suffers from too much detail. It is written primarily for a professional reader with a good technical understanding. The subject matter of this publication was presented at academic seminars by Demidenko and his coauthors at the Kiev Institute of Technology. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the effects of weapons of mass destruction and how an affected nation can survive as an entity. It is particularly recommended for individuals dealing with civil defense matters.

PART III
SOVIET NAVY

SOVIET NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE GREAT
PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945

by

V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich

Reviewed by: K. MICHELLE EMERSON

Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, written by V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, two respected Soviet historians, analyzes the development of Soviet naval science (which includes the strategic use of naval forces, their strategy, and tactics) as it evolved out of lessons learned during combat incidents of the Great Patriotic War.

The book critically examines the navy's mission during the war years and attempts to explain why situations happened the way they did, given the unprecedented scale and intensity of the Soviet navy's mission.

Major themes of the book that will be looked at include: 1) basically correct prewar employment of resources and forces, 2) heroic efforts of naval personnel despite limitations, 3) problems of combined operations, 4) problems of responsibility within the chain of command and, 5) the lack of respect for the Soviet navy.

The first theme to emerge points out that prewar strategic and operational employment of resources and forces were basically correct. "To a considerable extent the experience of the Great Patriotic War reaffirmed the correctness of prewar views on the

defense of our own maritime lines of communication."¹ Not all prewar tactics were correct, however. The authors state that "the severe demands of combat activity caused a significant change in prewar views concerning the standards of positioning a landing force aboard transports; ..."2

The next theme appeared throughout the book as pride for the heroic efforts of naval personnel despite limited plans, personnel and equipment. With their help, the Soviets were able to triumph over the Fascist Germans. "Thanks to the heroic efforts of the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, the Northern Fleet was reinforced, enabling it to launch combat operations against enemy sea lanes and to achieve significant successes."³

The third theme deals with the multitude of problems with combined operations--and the seriousness of reevaluating them. As a result of these operations, future decision-making was shaped. In one example it is shown that "lack of knowledge about the characteristics and capabilities of naval artillery on the part of joint force commanders and .. the meager organization of target reconnaissance..."4 we severe inadequacies in the use of artillery support at the beginning of the war. In another case "tactical

¹V.I. Achkasov and N.B. Pavlovich, Soviet Naval Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, (English translation by United States Naval Institute: Annapolis, Maryland), 1981, p. 296.

²Ibid., p. 98.

³Ibid., p. 219.

⁴Ibid., p. 171.

cooperation between aircraft and submarines remained for all practical purposes, an unsolved problem.."5

Soviet naval science changed as a result of problems found within the chain-of-command. One of the best examples of this concerns amphibious landings. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet executed a successful landing because "the commander of the designated forces..himself selected the landing sector."6 This was as opposed to all previous landings "when the landing sectors were decided at higher command levels.."7 and inevitably failed. The authors also detail a combat situation in which the abandonment of the Khar'kov might have been avoided if "a bold and timely decision by the commander in chief at a moment of crisis,"8 had been made without fear of being blamed "in event of failure.."9

The last major theme that is perhaps the most noticeable, is the lack of respect for the Soviet navy and its accompanying frustration for naval personnel. In case after case, the Navy requested assistance or a desire to provide more assistance, only to be turned down. For example, the Northern Fleet lacked naval aircraft and was obliged to ask the Fourteenth Army to assign bombers for joint operations with the Air Force. However, the Army

⁵Ibid., p. 213.

⁶Ibid., p. 127.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 279.

⁹Ibid.

was also short of aircraft and a situation had developed that eventually resulted in the Navy supporting the ground forces!¹⁰ Even within the Navy, the surface fleet always paled in comparison to submarines for inflicting the greatest losses to the enemy. "The relative significance of operations by each of the various types of Northern Fleet forces against enemy sea lanes remained the same...: submarines inflicted the greatest losses..and finally surface ships, which again shared last place with the coastal artillery."¹¹

The essence of the book appears to be the need to applaud the Soviet navy's efforts during the entire war period, gaining valuable lessons for the current debates revolving around the mission of the Soviet navy.

The book has much to offer. When considering who should read it, the recommendation is made that readers should include, but not be limited to, historians, naval officers, and World War II enthusiasts.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 199.

¹¹Ibid. p. 210.

THE SEA POWER OF THE STATE

by

S. G. Gorshkov

Reviewed by: MICHAEL J. UDELL

Introduction

The sea power of the State as defined by S.G. Gorshkov is the "capability of a country to utilize the military-economic resources of the ocean for its own purposes." Unlike most Western authors, Gorshkov readily acknowledge that a nation's sea power is not manifested by its naval forces alone, but rests in the unified efforts of the naval, transport, fishing, scientific-oceanographic, and other fleets. Within this system of forces the State's Navy is dominating and is given primary emphasis in his book.

Gorshkov's goal in the writing of this major work appears to be education of the political and military leaders regarding the massive growth of the Soviet Navy, its role within armed forces, and its importance as a tool in modern foreign policy. The book is intended to act as a bridge between the military doctrine handed down to Gorshkov from above and the reality of building and employing a modern navy. The book also shows the State exactly what it has, and will continue to get, in return for its enormous naval investment. Gorshkov's claim that the book is intended primarily for military readers is plainly contradicted

by the usually large printing run, which indicates that the true audience is much broader.

In support of the goal outlined above, there are several major themes evident throughout the work. The themes are presented in this document in a subjective order of importance assigned by the reviewer. No attempt has been made to adhere to the format of Gorshkov's book.

1. THE PROPER ROLE OF SEA POWER IS TO INFLUENCE EVENTS ASHORE.

While this is a familiar theme in most Western naval writings, Gorshkov argues for the supremacy of direct strike over the more traditional methods of sea control. Gorshkov claims that there exists a new naval mission of "crushing the military-economic potential of the enemy through direct action from the sea against vitally important centers." Gorshkov also states that "sea attacks against enemy territory have become the Soviet navy's basic mission." Gorshkov envisions the accomplishment of this mission through the use of nuclear powered strike submarines and, to a lesser extent, carrier based strike aircraft.

In addition to advocating the Soviet navy's shore strike mission, he warns of the formidable Western shore strike capability and their need to defend against it. To use Gorshkov's words "protecting one's own soil from attack by the enemy's navy is becoming the main goal of the navy."

2. NATIONS USE SEA POWER TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

Gorshkov uses the histories of the "imperialist" nations to repeatedly emphasize this theme. Often in the same paragraph he condemns the aggressive expansionist policies of nations like France, England, and the United States; and then points out that the principal reason underlying their successful periods of expansion was the effective use of sea power. Gorshkov states that "the navy has emerged as one of the most important instruments of State policy." Gorshkov is very careful to properly distinguish between the unjust "imperialist" use of sea power (gunboat diplomacy), and the friendly and just "socialist" assistance afforded to developing nations.

3. CONTROL OF THE SLOC'S ARE VITAL TO NATIONS THAT EXERT A GLOBAL INFLUENCE.

Gorshkov skillfully wields this argument like a double-edged sword. He takes great pains to point out the weakness of the United States brought about by our dependence on the SLOC's and their vulnerability to Soviet naval forces. Conversely, he makes it clear that a country with peaceful overseas commitments (like the Soviet Union) cannot afford to allow imperialist aggressors to deny them freedom of the seas.

Gorshkov demonstrates his correct perception that sea control is an end in itself by defining it as a "means by which

naval forces can carry out a specific mission in a certain region within a stipulated time period."

4. A NAVY MUST BE BALANCED.

Gorshkov defines balance loosely as "maintaining all the elements of combat strength in the most favorable combination." Gorshkov speaks of balance in two distinct contexts: The internal balance of forces within the navy, and the external balance of the navy within the armed forces as a whole. Gorshkov spends a large portion of his verbiage supporting this theme. The primary conclusion of his analysis of naval history is that an unbalanced navy is doomed to eventual failure.

Gorshkov claims that a balanced navy is "capable of carrying out varied missions under clear and non-nuclear conditions." By this he means that in addition to the shore strike mission, a navy must have the ability to conduct ASW, AAW, ASUW, and defensive operations. He also maintains that a numerically smaller but better balanced fleet is superior to a larger but less balanced one.

Within the context of a balanced armed forces, Gorshkov writes that "there cannot be a sphere of warfare in which any one branch of the armed forces is the absolute sovereign" and "the navy must be included and work within a unified military strategy."

5. THE NAVAL SERVICE IS BEST SUITED TO CONDUCT ARMED CONFLICT OUTSIDE OF EUROPE.

Gorshkov writes that "the Soviet Navy today is capable of successfully carrying out strategic missions by destroying important targets in enemy territory and destroy submarine platforms for nuclear weapons at sea." It is important to note that by not mentioning the other branches of the armed forces, Gorshkov is implying that the navy can independently conduct strategic missions. This is a significant departure from traditional military theory. It should also be emphasized that outside of Europe includes the rest of the entire world. Lastly, this theme is noteworthy because it appears only in an 11 page segment added to the second edition entitled "The Strategic Employment of the Navy."

6. THE NAVY OF THEE NEXT ARMED CONFLICT WILL BE BUILT DURING PEACETIME.

Gorshkov asserts that a modern naval war will be of short duration and will not allow either side the opportunity to construct new combatants prior to its conclusion. It is, therefore, of vital importance that the "development of each naval ship must concentrate on placing the most economical mix of dimension and displacement, assuring effective resolution of problems at minimal cost." Gorshkov claims that a "comprehensive system of scientific management is required to efficiently build a navy." In support of this goal, Gorshkov calls for the

construction of a powerful fleet of nuclear and diesel submarines capable of all the missions required of a balanced navy. He also argues for the construction of naval air platforms to perform sea and shore strikes. He lastly points out that surface ships must be included to "give combat stability to the submarine fleet."

CONCLUSION

Gorshkov's book is of considerable importance to present day naval readers. Contained within was a remarkably candid blueprint for the Soviet naval buildup of the late twentieth century that has shown little sign of change despite the historical events reshaping Eastern Europe. Although there is a tendency to review a writing such as this as wishful thinking on the part of the author, the phenomenal advances in Soviet submarine technology and their development of a modern aircraft carrier testify to the fiscal burden that the Soviet Union was willing to bear to bring Gorshkov's vision to fruition. It is truly remarkable that the historically secretive Soviets would have ever allowed such a pivotal work to be published in an unclassified form, let alone publish it themselves for Western distribution. This work stands firm as a rebuttal to the school of thought claiming that one must read Russian and have access to classified material in order to perform valid literature analysis.

THE NAVY: ITS ROLE, PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT
AND EMPLOYMENT

by

N.P. V'yunenko, Ed., et. al

Reviewed by: JOHN D. HEARING

The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment,¹ published in 1988, remains a subject of great debate to this day. Edited by the "Father of the Modern Soviet Navy," the late Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union S. G. Gorshkov, The Navy was his last major work on seapower before his death in 1988. Much of the controversy around the book has involved assessing what impact it will have on the post-Gorshkov Navy. This is what this paper will address.

The three main authors who worked with Gorshkov are not lightweights in the area of naval strategy and technology. N. P. V'yunenko is a retired Rear Admiral of the Soviet Navy and was a major player in the writing of Gorshkov's master treatise on navies, The Seapower of the State.² Captain 1st Rank B. N. Makeyev is a ranking naval strategist and is still on active duty³ while

¹V'yunenko, N. P., Rear Admiral, et al, The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development, and Employment, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1988 (NIC Translation)

²Gorshkov, S. G., Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, The Seapower of the State, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1979, pp. xi.

³Goure, Leon, "The Soviet Strategic View," Strategic Review, Vol. XVIII, Nr. 1, Winter 1989, pp. 85.

the third author, Captain 1st Rank V. D. Skugarev, is a retired naval armaments expert.;⁴ Gorshkov himself wrote the extensive foreword, but was not listed as an author (as he was in Sea Power of the State) but rather as editor, so his actual role in the writing of this book is unclear.

It is interesting to note that only 25,000 copies of this book were printed versus over 120,000 copies of the two editions of Sea Power of the State- a significant drop in numbers. It is also instructive to note who the book was intended for. The audience of the book is listed in the frontispiece as "navy personnel and readers interested in problems of the navy's development," while Gorshkov states a few pages later:

This book is also of interest for everyone involved in problems of scientific-technical development and that it has been written in popular language⁵

This would appear to be a large interest group for the number of books published.

The Navy's focus is on the future of development of naval power, taking past and current naval developments and attempting to forecast the future of navies in general and the Soviet Navy in particular, in order to determine what decisions need to be made to keep pace with naval technological developments. Among the major themes addressed in the book are:

⁴Ibid, pp. 85.

⁵The Navy, pp. 10.

- Importance of Oceans and SLOCs: These are described as being important objectives in wartime and areas for conflict for all armed forces:--

The ocean is turning more and more into an arena of combat for all branches of the armed forces, where each of them will make its contribution.⁶

Also pointed out are "the changes occurring in the alignment of forces in the world arena and the [need] to react appropriately to the growing threat from sea and ocean sectors,"⁷ an apparent reference to the cruise missile threat that is often repeated.

- Strategic Missions for the Services: The Navy describes the primary missions of armed forces as being 1) to repel aerospace attack,⁸ 2) to suppress the enemies military-economic potential,⁹ and 3) to destroy groupings of enemy armed forces.¹⁰ As Captain William Manthorpe, USN (Ret), Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence noted, these admissions of "new" priorities are among the first concrete writings we have on the actual missions of the Soviet Armed Forces under the "Defensive Doctrine."

- Special Features of Naval Developments: The Navy notes a number of factors about naval development that make it different than other arms development areas, including that naval equipment

⁶The Navy, pp. 26.

⁷The Navy, pp. 7.

⁸The Navy, pp. 29.

⁹The Navy, pp. 31.

¹⁰The Navy, pp. 32.

and arms are especially vulnerable to scientific and technical progress and that the lengthy service and repeated modernization of naval vessels requires long-term forecasting. The argument is also made that the special nature of naval warfare creates a need for a balanced navy and:

Naval arms are an integral subsystem of the overall system of armed forces. Therefore, naval arms must be balanced according to missions and resources not only within the navy, but also with arms of the other branches of the armed forces.¹¹

- Trends in the development of Navies: The authors go into detailed explanation of their forecasting methodology, but the final analysis of future naval developments include:

- Further development of strategic capabilities, especially in sea launched missiles;
- Buildup of the striking power of general purpose forces, principally aircraft carriers, with a potential successor being the new generation of cruisers with air capability;
- Continued importance of the role of multi-role submarines;
- Increased capabilities for cruise missiles;
- New roles for lasers in shipboard air defense, not to mention particle beam weapons;

Additionally, the major categories of naval forces are examined for their own prospects:

- Surface Forces: The Navy states:

Surface ships have developed into global general-purpose naval forces, an effective reserve of the strategic forces and the striking power... in local wars. Aircraft carriers are the basis of these forces...¹²

¹¹The Navy, pp. 53.

¹²The Navy, pp. 100.

- Submarines: Future development in terms of increased speed and depth capability, increased weapons capability (improved torpedoes, and especially cruise missiles) is expected, but it is interesting to note that nowhere near the same emphasis was made of submarine warfare in this book as was made in Sea Power of the State.

- Naval Aviation: Big changes in the land based Naval aviation that the Soviets possess today are expected:

Naval aviation is coalescing with other naval forces-especially with the union of aircraft and ships. The advent of cruise missiles on ships and submarines has reduced the need for missile armed aviation in hitting ground targets.¹³

Some important points are raised multiple times, including:

- The use of the term "Naval Art" - something that has been said not to exist at the level of Military Art.

- The role of the Navy in Strategic missions - a definite slap at the multiple Soviet authors who have said that there are no strategic missions for a Navy (except SSBNs);

- The impact of cruise missile advances and capabilities.

- The Navy as the best choice for strategic defense of the homeland via anti-SSBN/anti-Sea Launched Cruise Missile efforts and anti-Air Launched Cruise Missile defense.

- The impact of sea control on continental success and the defense of the Soviet Homeland - another slap at the continental/ground strategy proponents.

¹³The Navy, pp. 122.

- The need for aircraft carriers to provide the above...

Reactions to this book were interesting to note. Western reactions have been mixed, with views including those who regarded it as a nuclear warfighting doctrine,¹⁴ as Gorshkov's "Last Salvo" (after being forced out 6 months after the ascendancy of Gorbachev),¹⁵ as a sales document to make a case for a large and modernized navy in the perestroika era,¹⁶ or as a combination sales brochure/seapower primer for the new movers and shakers of the Soviet Government: the civilian intellectuals and arms control "experts"¹⁷. The latter theory is this author's favorite in light of the current debate over future defense expenditures and the apparent aiming of this book at a "popular" audience instead of a military one. At the same time, Soviet reaction to the book was strangely muted, especially for a book that contained such heresy against the Ground Forces-dominated military hierarchy. Admiral Chernavin distanced himself by stating:

The authors set down their opinions of the main strategic tasks of tomorrow which may be of interest to a certain group of writers to acquaint them with the g e n e r a l

¹⁴Brooks, Thomas, Rear Admiral, USN, "A Nuclear War-Fighting Treatise," Proceedings, Naval Review Issue, May 1989, pp. 137.

¹⁵Herrick, Robert, CDR, USN, "A Uniquely Naval Design," Proceedings, Naval Review Issue, May 1989, pp. 147.

¹⁶Goure, pp. 85.

¹⁷Neely, Theodore and CAPT Steve Kime, USN, "Perestroika, Doctrinal Change, and the Soviet Navy," Strategic Review, Vol. XVI, Nr. 4, Fall 1988, pp. 53.

principles of navies.¹⁸

The only other notable reaction was a bitter denunciation of the prospective anti-strategic platform mission of the navy by Aleksandr Savelyev, who felt that this would increase the possibility of escalation.¹⁹ Beyond this, and for reasons that are unclear, little or no notice has apparently been taken of this book.

What will be the long-term impact of The Navy? At this juncture it is still too early to tell. The lack of reaction in the Soviet Union might indicate that its impact will be minimal, but this would be unlikely for a book with Gorshkov's name on it. Probably the best indicators of the impact of this book will be the Soviet shipbuilding program. If the current aircraft carrier program continues to progress after the adoption of the next Five Year Plan this summer, and submarine and surface ship construction continue at the pace, it will be obvious that "Gorshkov's Final Salvo" will have been an effective one.

¹⁸"Chernavin Responds," Proceedings, Vol. 115. Nr. 2, February 1989, pp. 75.

¹⁹Savelyev, A. S., "NATO, Warsaw Pact Doctrines Viewed," FBIS translation of article in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, published June 1989, FBIS-SOV-89-133-A, 13 July 1989, pp.7.

PART IV

COMPARATIVE DOCUMENTS

THE THREAT TO EUROPE
(Progress Publishers 1981)

HOW TO AVERT THE THREAT TO EUROPE
(Progress Publishers 1981)

THE NEW THREAT TO EUROPE: WHO IS TO BLAME?
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing House 1984)

Reviewed by: GARY GROOMS

The following is a review and comparative analysis of three books entitled The Threat to Europe, How to Avert the Threat to Europe, and The New Threat to Europe: Who is to Blame? written by a group of Soviet Academicians. The first two books were published in response to the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM). They also serve as a partial rebuttal to then Secretary of Defense Weinberger's Soviet Military Power book. The third book was published after the US began deploying the missiles in December 1983.

Printed in English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, Italian, and Dutch, the books were aimed at the West European public, in an effort to severely discredit and preferably reverse the NATO dual-track decision. The NATO dual track decision was adopted on 12 December 1979 in response to Soviet SS-20 missile deployments. It stated that NATO would begin deploying US GLCMs and Pershing II ballistic missiles in December 1983 if no arms control agreement had been reached between the US and USSR to restore the balance in intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) to the lowest possible

level.

The first book, The Threat to Europe, written by the Soviet Committee for European Security and published shortly after Soviet Military Power, was meant to reflect the opinion of the Soviet public. Written in a question and answer format, the authors answered questions posed by an imaginary western skeptic in an effort to dispel all the alleged myths and misperceptions the West has of Soviet military doctrine, weapons development, and arms control initiatives.

The writers contend that the Soviets don't seek military superiority, only maintenance of parity. In addition, the Warsaw Treaty Organization exists to prevent war as well as defend against outside aggression. However, this is qualified by the belief that defense must be equal to the aggressor in order to retaliate. The authors accuse the West of quoting Soviet literature on battlefield tactics out of context, in order to depict Soviet military doctrine as offensive. Furthermore, they caution the West not to mistake concepts of the 1960's with those of the 1970's and 1980's. Accordingly, 1981 Soviet military doctrine neither allows for a first or preemptive strike nor can there be winners in a global nuclear war. They also assert a limited nuclear war can't be fought.

Due to the greater geographic area of the USSR and Warsaw Pact as opposed to the US and NATO area, the Soviets justify a need for large numbers of weapons, equipment, and men. Failing to mention

the posture of their own forces, the authors justified SS-20 deployment based on forward deployment of US nuclear weapons systems as well as British S-2 and S-3 missiles. Disregarding the threat SS-20 missiles posed to Europe, the Soviets tagged US missiles as strategic because they could hit targets within the USSR.

The book stressed that nearly every new Soviet weapon system has been built in response to weapons developed in the West. Although they pointed to Pershing II and cruise missiles as first strike weapons enabling limited nuclear war to take place in Europe, they didn't mention the purpose of their own SS-20s if limited nuclear war isn't possible in their eyes.

The writers portrayed the US as forcing INF deployment on the West Europeans because Americans never intended to have serious INF negotiations. Attempting to decouple the US from NATO, the US is indicated as preferring rearmament over arms control negotiations. To fuel the peace movement in Europe at this time, the Soviets criticized the US for not ratifying SALT II and for rejecting a laundry list of Soviet arms control proposals.

A book review appearing in the September 1982 edition of Moscow's Soviet Military Review lauded the book, then launched into further arguments in support of Soviet military doctrine. The book also received some fairly unbiased publicity in the Washington Post, New York Times, and the Baltimore Sun which viewed the book as repudiating the offensive Soviet doctrine of the 1960's.

How to Avert the Threat to Europe, written by a group of

writers from the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation and the Scientific Research Council on Peace and Disarmament is a continuation of The Threat to Europe. This book is meant to show the West the continuity between the USSR's new leader, Andropov, and his predecessor Brezhnev.

The book points to the 1982 Soviet pledge of no first-use of nuclear weapons as further evidence of their defensive doctrine. A Washington Post article in April 1983 saw the book as another part of the Soviet campaign to prevent deployment of US INF missiles in Europe. Perhaps subtly forecasting things to come if the US deploys the missiles, the authors refer to the Soviet navy as a "major ocean power," whereas in the first book the navy was an "important sea power" which had to compensate for small allied navies.

The New Threat to Europe: Who is to Blame? looks at the aftermath of the US missile deployment. All guilt for a renewed arms race is placed on the US and NATO (especially, Britain, West Germany, and Italy since their governments were viewed as the most cooperative with the US). Now, the US and NATO are accused of increasing the danger of war by accident due to decreased flight time, as if to say Soviet control over their SS-20s is infallible. (Note: Chernenko is the new Soviet leader now)

The peace loving Soviets of the first two books disclose their countermeasures to the INF deployment in this book, which are: no Geneva talks until pre-deployment conditions are returned to Europe; a lifting of their loosely kept moratorium on SS-20

deployments; announced preparations to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in East Germany and Czechoslovakia; and finally, matching the US deployment with equivalent weapons at sea.

All three books provide top quality Soviet propaganda from the frustrated advocate of peace and disarmament to the reluctant bear pushed back into the arms race and the cold war by the West. To charm the Western public, the books are devoid of ideological rhetoric. The books also offer a glimpse at possible future Soviet arms control proposals, how they view various weapons systems, and how geography makes the USSR unique militarily.

WHENCE THE THREAT TO PEACE

Reviewed by: PAUL BROWN

The Soviet government published a series of booklets entitled "Whence the Threat to Peace" in response to "Soviet Military Power," the series which depicts the official U.S. view of the Soviet military build-up and ensuing threat to the West. The "Whence the Threat to Peace" series consists of four editions (1982), a supplemented second edition also in 1982, 1984 and 1987) published by the military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Moscow. Like its American policy support program counterpart, "Whence the Threat to Peace" presents a one-sided explanation of the phenomenon known as the arms race and in so doing seeks to justify the policy decisions and procurement programs which have been undertaken by the Soviet government. Since this is a political document drafted specifically to support policy and does not employ methodological rigor or analytical objectivity, no new ground is broken and no new alternatives are explored. The principal value of this work is two-fold; it clearly depicts the Soviet perspective of hostile encirclement by foreign powers (via colorful graphical layouts) and more importantly provides a source of material for examining the evolution of Soviet defense prioritization during the Reagan presidency. A simplified form of content analysis can be used to identify and extract valid Soviet defense themes from the voluminous quantity of propaganda

inherent in the documents. On the lighter side, it is of undeniable enjoyment to examine the improvement in the Soviet Union's ability to produce slick, Madison Avenue style propaganda which can compete with the West. Significant progress was made from the colorless, pictureless precursor to "Whence the Threat to Peace" entitled "The Threat to Europe." As cleverly phrased in one book review ". . . with what Western experts consider to be an alarming sophistication and in a remarkably short period of time, the Soviets have closed the [color-propaganda-booklet] gap."¹ In fact the very cover of the publication progresses from block lettering only, to lettering accompanied by an ICBM drawing, to pictures of platforms of the American nuclear triad, and finally to a true high-tech superimposing of pentagon, ICBM and Earth images.

The Soviet sensitivity to what it clearly perceives as hostile encirclement is presented on a series of graphics; one depicts the forward deployed and threatening posture of U.S. forces worldwide, others show the U.S. military overseas basing scheme and how it can be reinforced in time of conflict while still others depict the targets held at risk from American theater nuclear forces. It is especially interesting to note that a graphic introduced in the 1984 edition (pre INF treaty) projected the coverage of NATO based Pershing II and ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) systems using a polar coordinate construct. This

¹Anthony Barbieri, Jr. "Mutual assured distraction: Soviet flacks close 'booklet'." The Baltimore Sun, 18 January 1982, p.2.

is certainly a valid navigational orientation and one which enabled the Soviets to show that in terms of missile range alone, major cities in Africa, the Middle East and even Scandinavia are potentially at risk from American INF systems in addition to cities in Europe and the USSR. A clearly expanded public relations impact was achieved than that which a standard Mercator projection map of the European theater would have made possible. Depiction of American cruise missile trajectories over Norway, and Sweden also effectively served to exacerbate the highly sensitive implications of cruise missile deployments and the execution of the U.S. maritime strategy. It is critical, however, for a serious student of strategic policy issues to visualize the world from the Soviet perspective and appreciate the real security fears the Soviet Union has and not to simply dismiss them as Cold War propaganda.

The source of the numbers employed by the Soviets throughout the series for the comparison of force levels were attributed to the respected London International Institute for Strategic and Studies (IISS) and in later editions from various American publications themselves (e.g. "Aviation Weekly"). As in any policy supporting document, clever manipulation of numbers occurs and can be identified. In addition to the manipulation which is expected, "Whence the Threat to Peace" contains some clearly inaccurate data and some strategically minor (yet nonetheless identifiable) internal inconsistencies. (Internal discrepancies in Soviet assessments of American bomber assets can be easily found for those willing to do the basic math.) The assertion that the U.S. defense

budget grew in excess of 13 per cent in 1978-1980 and by 19 per cent in 1981 is simply not true and neither is their count of U.S. uniformed manpower (the Soviets claim the U.S. has nearly three million). The Soviets, unlike the U.S., have no excuse for these inaccurate figures since they are a matter of public record and are easily verified. In the latter two editions, the period 1981-1983 was selected for analysis of the U.S. defense budget and the clearly erroneous figures of the previous editions were dropped. Another glaring numerical discrepancy is the Soviet inclusion of the training carrier Lexington and unusable reserve U.S. carriers in its accounting procedure while excluding their own armor and artillery reserves which have immediate activation potential. The Soviets chose to compare total populations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact rather than the more strategically significant statistics for population of military-age men and the mobilization assessment potential for each side.

The Soviets present a powerful case that they have historically reacted to Western military innovation and that the United States has misrepresented the threat at various historical junctures (e.g. the grossly exaggerated "bomber gap" and "missile

gap").² They do, however, selectively choose a restrictive and self-serving selection of procurement cases, fail to mention objectively assess why the U.S. felt compelled to build or that Moscow's technological base was destined to fail when attempting to compete with Washington. When the series was published, Moscow adamantly denied its development of binary chemical weapons (which has since been repudiated) and in the fourth edition audaciously accuse the U.S. of violating the ABM treaty because of an alleged phased array radar system in Thule, Greenland. This is nothing short of outrageous since the Soviet Krasnoyarsk phased array radar was an obvious violation. Party-line Soviet defense priorities can be traced through each document's presentation of the Soviet reactive posture in the post-war arms race, an analysis of the U.S. war machine, carefully selected factors in the East-West military balance, and a chronology of U.S. militancy in the world as contrasted to Soviet restraint and love for peace. To an even greater extent that "Soviet Military Power," "Whence the Threat to Peace," examines each competitive category from the sole perspective of drafting superpower, in lieu of simultaneous, side-by-side comparisons. This incomplete approach can lead all but the

²In the second edition the Soviets demonstrate an awareness of how to play the semantics game by including a section entitled "How Windows are Created" in which they extol the American penchant for the creation of paranoid "windows of vulnerability" and "weapons gaps." They also take a semantic cheap shot by highlighting the fact that American intercontinental nuclear forces are titled "strategic offensive forces" whereas their weaponry is not termed offensive because it will not be used in any offensive role.

sophisticated and well-versed analysis to spurious conclusions. The omission of Soviet bases and facilities abroad (e.g. Eastern Europe, Vietnam, Cuba, etc.) from the description of the overseas assets enjoyed by the U.S., for example, is indicative of this methodological construct. A more inclusive and contextually unbiased approach would have enhanced the documents' credibility to some degree.

Another recurring theme is the public relations improvement inherent in the later editions. By simply not labeling the Western allies as "bellicose partners" in the third and fourth editions (as they were in the first two) the Soviets acknowledged that one can catch more flies with honey than one can with flypaper. The Soviets take excellent advantage of the U.S. bungling of the Reykjavik Summit to charge that the Americans aren't serious about strategic arms control. The documents are able to score political points by selective quotations of President Reagan, Secretary of State Haig and Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese on politically sensitive issues, specifically the fighting of a limited nuclear war and American willingness to reinterpret or ignore provisions of previous arms control agreements.

The "Whence the Threat to Peace" series delivers what it promises: a Soviet perspective of the superpower arms race. It is intended for anyone who is interested in the issues which comprise superpower military policy. It is a readable series which can be digested and comprehended by the public but is also of interest and value to the serious student of the subject since

official government positions, despite their inherent biases, are important to understand, analyze and debate. The publication is a useful tool for understanding the international military balance from a Soviet perspective and studying the evolution of Soviet defence policy in the 1980's.

THE U.S. MILITARY DOCTRINE

by

GENERIKH TROFIMENKO
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986)

Reviewed by: MICHAEL WEISS

The U.S. Military Doctrine provides an analysis of U.S. National security policy from the time the founding fathers up to 1985 with particular emphasis paid to America's "nuclear era" of 1945 to 1985. The author is the director of the foreign policy department of the Institute of the United States and Canada in Moscow.

The Main theme of the book is that American policy under the founding fathers was one of a balance of power and shifted after 1945 to one of a "Pax Americana" thanks to the advent of the U.S.'s nuclear arsenal. The founding fathers were described as being well-read individuals who had a very sound understanding of politics and international relations. The U.S., faced with a combination of weak neighbors to the north and south and a weak military, preferred a foreign policy based on a balance of power -- playing off European nations that would tend to enhance America's objectives. Trofimenko credits men such as Washington, Jeffereson, Hamilton and Jackson with understanding the place of war as a "continuation of politics" 50 years prior to Clausewitz. Such was the wisdom of the early Americans. However, up to the end of World War II, with the exception of Mahan, the U.S. has

produced no great theorists and furthermore has produced no Clausewitz's or many who rank with the leading European theorists of war. Americans, according to Trofimenko, to this day do not even possess a clear-cut distinction between military doctrine and strategy whereas the Soviet Union has a firm grasp of the differences.

While the national security policy of America was sufficient for its time, policy took a drastic shift when America used atomic weapons against Japan. The decision to drop the bomb, according to the author, was not so much to end the war -- the Soviets had already beaten Hitler and were concentrating well enough on Japan -- but to demonstrate American military might to the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent China. This single event ushered in an era of American desire for world hegemony and the policies of Containment (1949-53), Massive Retaliation (1953-60), and Flexible Response (1961-69). These policies were aimed at destroying the Soviet socialist ideology while promoting American beliefs onto the rest of the world. Trofimenko fails in his account to mention the role played by the Berlin Blockade in 1948 and 1949 plus the construction of the Berlin Wall and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis on the shaping of U.S. policy. Rather, it appears to the world's benefit that the Soviets were able to "contain" the U.S.

The most notable failures of the American national security policy manifested themselves in the outcome of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. By writing about and subsequently criticizing American policy, Trofimenko may be attempting to critique Soviet

thinking along the same lines. Pointing at faults in American policy formation and in particular the U.S. propaganda machine of building a ten-foot tall giant in the form of the Soviet Union which added much fuel to the arms race could be the author's own way of voicing his opinion of the Soviet policy-making process. Statements such as "In any U.S. Congress, no more than fifteen people can lay claim to any real competence in matters concerning the world military balance and weapons system" (p. 132) seem especially aimed at a Politburo during a time in which a major debate was taking place concerning their own military doctrine and strategy. Further criticisms of U.S. "think tanks" could reflect a displeasure with the output of Soviet counterpart organizations. Trofimenko also predicts that the U.S. is on the road to economic ruin because of its reckless ways concerning arms buildups.

My favorite section of the book and one I would highly recommend to anyone who would be going to the Soviet Union or be dealing with the Soviets in any type of negotiations would be the short 17 page section entitled "Falsifying the "Enemy's Intentions and Image: The American Way of Justifying the Arms Race." The excuses used by the Reagan administration and misinformation techniques used against the American military and government leaders creates fertile ground for fear of the peace-loving Soviets to grow forth. The book addresses the U.S. Navy as almost an afterthought and describes its missions and composition in no where near the depth applied in the rest of the book. It seems as though the authors intent was to voice approval of Admiral Gorshkov's

thoughts concerning the use of a navy.

I enjoyed the book very much. Trofimenko writes well and adds a bit of sarcastic spice in a way that he demonstrates an American way of thinking. The book is heavy at times on political rhetoric but overall would be a valuable aid to anyone who needs to view American doctrine from a Soviet perspective and also be aware of arguments to American policy-making and outcome.

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